Nikolas Kozloff

According to a recent poll conducted by the American Research Group, a startling 54% of the U.S. public now favors impeachment of Vice President Cheney. Apparently, Americans have had enough of Cheney's misleading the public on Iraqi WMD, his fabrications seeking to tie al-Qaeda to Saddam Hussein's regime, and his repeated threats against Iran.

 

Recently, Congressman Dennis Kunicich (D-OH), introduced H. Res. 333 calling for Cheney's impeachment under these very grounds. Because of the blackout in the corporate media, however, few Americans are aware of Kucinich's resolution which has now attracted 14 likely co-sponsors. Recently, the House Judiciary Committee took a big step by sending HR 333 to the Constitution Subcommittee led by Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY).

 

For the past few years, I have felt largely powerless to stop the Bush White House from carrying out its nefarious foreign policy agenda. But Nadler, a pivotal figure in the unfolding impeachment drama, is a liberal legislator whose office is located on Varick Street in Lower Manhattan. Though I currently reside in Park Slope, Brooklyn, I grew up a scant few blocks from Nadler's office.

 

A couple of days ago, I received an e-mail from my cousin, a tireless and dedicated activist working with World Can't Wait, which has been pressing hard for town hall impeachment meetings across the country. The group, my cousin said, was organizing a trip to Nadler's office to get him to support HR 333.

 

Yesterday morning, I caught the #1 train to the Houston Street station. Gathered outside a Latin music club was a group of some twenty, mostly elderly New York activists. Some had come to Lower Manhattan with the intention of conducting a sit-in at Nadler's office. The city has been in the midst of an uncomfortable heat wave, and while activists conferred I quickly ducked into a store to get some iced tea.

 

My cousin explained that the purpose of the visit was to get Nadler to sign on to the bill, press for a hearing on the bill in subcommittee, and hold a vote to pass the resolution. In addition, she wanted Nadler to press for adoption of the bill in the Judiciary Committee and to move the bill out to the House of Representatives. Lastly, my cousin sought to press Nadler to encourage his colleagues to sign on to the bill, and bring it to the attention of the Democratic Caucus for support.

 

Unfortunately, Nadler had hardly been responsive to activists' on the issue of Cheney impeachment and put folks through a go-around. World Can't Wait tried to make an appointment with the Congressman through his Varick Street office, but was told that he had already met with constituents on the issue.

 

When the group was told that it might get Nadler's position by phoning his Washington, D.C. office, activists called but were unable to get through because of the July 4th vacation week. At long last, World Can't Wait left phone and e-mail messages alerting Nadler's Manhattan office that activists would stop by on Monday since it was an urgent matter.

 

As the heat burnt through the pavement, my cousin described our strategy: rather than go into Nadler's office on the sixth floor in a group, we would go up in twos and threes. Such elaborate tomfoolery had become necessary, she said, because the authorities were unlikely to let the entire delegation proceed together. At long last, my turn arrived. Together with another gentleman, I walked into the Federal Building across the street from the Latin music club.

 

Inside the lobby were two big portraits of George Bush and Dick Cheney. I did not see some of the earlier members of our party, leading me to think that indeed some activists had succeeded in getting up to Nadler's office. But when I arrived at the security check, my hopes plummeted.

"Are you going to Nadler's office?" asked a guard, suspiciously.

 

"No officer," we replied innocently, "We're just headed to the Peace Corps office."

 

Judging from the security guards' expressions, they were unconvinced by our alibi. After we passed our spare change, keys and cell phones through the detector one of the guards escorted us up in the elevator, just to make sure we went to the tenth floor and not to the sixth floor.

"For Christ's sake, this is ridiculous," I remarked hotly to my colleague. "I understand that the White House and certain government offices are very difficult to get access to. But this is our local Congressman!"

 

While we picked up an application to join the Peace Corps inside, our guardian waited outside for us to exit the office.

 

"What can we do?" I asked my colleague, feeling frustrated and trapped.

 

"Not much," he replied. "It looks like we're just going to have to return to the lobby."

Right on cue our guardian rejoined us in the hallway and rode down with us in the elevator, just to make sure that we would not visit the Congressman's office. I wondered what would happen if we simply opted to get off at the sixth floor.

 

I put the question to our group's legal advisor outside.

 

"Under what law could he have stopped us?" I asked. "Going to a Congressman's office in a public building?"

 

He chuckled and remarked, "They are the law. They have the guns."

 

As I stood outside on Varick Street, I spoke with several other activists who were similarly outraged by the Orwellian treatment they had received at the hands of the guards. Some had been turned back at the security check and told they could not proceed at all.

 

In aggravation, I rode back to Brooklyn on the subway. Later, I got an e-mail from my cousin. Some activists had indeed managed to get into Nadler's office, to the "chagrin" of his staff. An unhappy Robert Gottheim, Nadler's District Director, was called in to deal with the activists. When my cousin and others requested to speak with Nadler either in person or by speaker phone or conference call, Gottheim said no: Nadler was unavailable.

 

When activists asked Gottheim to tell Security to allow the rest of the delegation to come upstairs the Nadler handler refused. Hardly a hospitable host, Gottheim similarly refused to invite the activists into the office. Activists were told they could sit down in one of four seats in the entranceway.

 

The activists then eloquently presented their case. Gottheim, aptly demonstrating his stonewalling abilities and penchant to be a party hack, repeatedly stated that impeachment was a distraction from other things the Democrats sought to accomplish. Trotting out familiar Inside the Beltway group think, Gottheim claimed impeachment was not practical because the Democrats could not muster two thirds of Congress to vote for such a measure.

 

At that, Gottheim ended the discussion. When activists said they wanted to wait to speak to Nadler, Gottheim got hot under the collar. Putting on his suit jacket, he declared that the activists were in a Federal Building and should leave. Organizers stayed for about another hour or so, but finally opted to leave when it became clear Nadler was a clear No Show.

 

What is the significance of yesterday's events? In a report on the action, World Can't Wait expressed mild surprise at Gottheim's surly treatment "since the Congressman has always been gracious to anti-war and peace proponents."

 

Indeed, the liberal Nadler seems to be gearing up for a rather uncharacteristic fight with his constituents over the impeachment issue. No doubt he is feeling the heat from House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, who has stated that impeachment should be "off the table."

 

What will Nadler do, continue to shrug off his constituents by having guards shadow activists up and down the Federal Building? With the public infuriated over Cheney's conduct, such a position would appear to be politically untenable. The Congressman, however, seems determined to declare "case closed" on the impeachment issue and to insulate himself from contrary views.

 

It's time for New Yorkers to gird up for an intense struggle with Nadler over the coming weeks. If the Congressman can't bring himself to exercise his duties as Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the House Judiciary Committee, then we ought to provide him with a civics lesson concerning the proper functioning of the Legislative Branch.

Recently, I caught up with Magdalena Cajias, a historian at the Upper University of San Andres, Bolivia, and producer of the documentary film, Achacachi, the Aymara Insurgency. During their interview, Cajias discussed endemic racism in Bolivian society, Aymara cultural nationalism, and the relationship between social movements and the government of Evo Morales. –editors.

NIKOLAS KOZLOFF: Could you tell me a bit about your professional background?

Magdalena Cajias: I´m a historian and I also produced a documentary in 2002 about the indigenous movement. I spent two years gathering first hand testimonials from campesinos hailing from the altiplano [highlands] who were linked to the indigenous leader Felipe Quispe. In 2000, Quispe was my student in the history department. When he was detained following a blockade, we sent a letter of support from our department. Quispe told us he was interested in recovering first hand testimonials from those who participated in the blockade. We started to conduct visits and conduct interviews. Through Quispe, who gave us permission, we were able to sit in on key meetings where participants were discussing the course of the campesino and indigenous movement. Our documentary was the result of this work.

NK: How has racism worked historically in Bolivia?

MC: The Indians have had two approaches towards the Bolivian state and white or mestizo society. On the one hand, they have pursued integration. They have linked up with populist parties, principally the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (known in Spanish under the acronym MNR). But if you go back even to the colonial period, you can find many instances in which the Indians pursued negotiation and integration with white and mestizo society. Aymaras on the other hand have cultivated their own sense of identity and self determination.

NK: So, how did it work exactly, were certain professions off limits?

MC: At certain times, we might speak of a white minority in Bolivia, although no one is really white here. As in the U.S. with the black codes, the municipal government of La Paz had certain established forms of discrimination in the beginning of the twentieth century. On buses and trams, you had to sit in the back. There was explicit and implicit discrimination. The possibility that Indians would ever attain important government positions was practically nil.

NK: Have race relations improved?

MC: No. I think actually what has happened is that the Indians´ discourse, which has tended on the radical side, i.e. that all whites have oppressed us, etc., has produced a reaction amongst the middle class which reside in the south of La Paz. As a result, the middle class has become more racist. There’s a lot of fear, now that there’s an indigenous president. The middle class has been excluded from the positions it occupied before, and has lost a bit of its social position.

NK: How is racism manifested?

MC: During moments of political conflict, in October 2003 and later when Evo Morales assumed the presidency, rumors circulated that the Indians were going to bust into the homes of white people. I could show you e-mails that have circulated in moments of crisis. For example, when the government was debating a new land law, thousands of Indians came to San Francisco Square. E-mails declared that the Indians were staging an invasion. This is the kind of rhetoric that harks back to the beginning of the twentieth century.

NK: So, notwithstanding all of the momentous recent political changes, La Paz continues to be a racist city?

MC: Racism exists, but now there are more ways to confront it. The Indians feel they have more clout, because they’re in the government now. Sometimes however the Indians exaggerate, they act out inverse racism. It’s like women who refuse to accept men, who are labeled as the oppressors, etc. We’ve had very heated rhetoric coming from the Minister of External Relations [David Choquehanca, an Aymara Indian], who said he could not go to the south of La Paz "because they all hate me there." So, on both sides we get this kind of confrontational discourse. In my own personal case, my father was very, very dark and my mother was rather white. If people don’t know me, they say, "She´s a white professor" in a disparaging manner.

NK: To what extent does cultural nationalism have to do with hatred towards whites?

MC: There is a certain degree of resentment. We’re not living in South Africa, but who’s had access to education? The sons of whites and mestizos. On the other hand, Aymara nationalism is more confrontational in its rhetoric than in actual practice.

NK: Now that cultural nationalism is on the rise, will we see more Indians in the media and will Quechua and Aymara become official languages?

MC: Of course. In state entities, studying Aymara is mandatory. In the Ministry of External Relations people are required to speak Aymara. Whites have made fun of this. They say that officials should instead know how to speak German, French, and English. In the Constituent Assembly, certainly indigenous languages will become official. One of the principal aims of the Educational Reform has been to recognize not only Aymara and Quechua but also the languages of eastern Bolivia and Guarani.

NK: But, watching TV here I don’t see any Indian presenters…?

MC: On Channel 7, which is state-owned, Aymara ought to be spoken. I’ve seen some Aymara programming here and there, but not very much. In general though, TV is much less popular amongst the Indians than radio.

NK: And you hear more indigenous languages on radio?

MC: Yes, a lot of Aymara.

NK: There’s talk of creating an ethnically pluralistic nation, but I wonder whether the Aymaras and Quechuas get along?

MC: Traditionally they’ve had their rivalries but that was a long time ago because of course the Quechuas conquered the Aymara. To this day there are differences between the two peoples. Quechuas have always pursued closer societal integration and have interbred with outsiders to a greater extent. The rivalry between Quechuas and Aymaras was manifest in the relationship between Felipe Quispe and Evo Morales when they were both powerful. Of course, now Quispe doesn’t have much of a following and Evo has capitalized on indigenous sentiment which is totally in his favor. The two differed, not only in terms of their ideological vision but also in ethnic terms. Evo has Aymara roots but identified as Quechua because he was from the coca zone.

NK: Do these rivalries form a barrier for nation building?

MC: It might. In an effort to construct a state with a common identity, we may wind up with a very fractured society. Even more than the Quechua-Aymara split, there are a lot of divisions in Aymara society itself amongst different communities. On the other hand, in critical moments such as 2003 in the city of El Alto, there was a certain unity amongst diverse social sectors such as miners, rural and urban settlers. Quechuas and Aymaras meanwhile worked to help each other out.

NK: What was your impression of Quispe when you filmed the documentary?

MC: Quispe was intelligent and skilled at cultivating a certain discourse at a precise moment. His ideology was based on recuperating ethnic and cultural elements within the larger social struggle. Quispe´s struggle wasn´t always so abstract: he and his followers would initiate a blockade so as not to pay for water service, or to reclaim lands. On the other hand, we noticed that no one could go to meetings without putting on a poncho.

NK: How do nationalist Indians perceive Morales?

MC: I think Morales didn’t use to cultivate an ethnic discourse, he was someone who defended coca, who had a more worker oriented, anti-imperialist rhetoric. But then he incorporated Quispe’s radicalism, i.e., "I am an Indian, that is why they mistreat me," etc.

NK: Does the idea of forming a separate Aymara nation enjoy much support?

MC: No. That´s why Quispe no longer has much of a following. Aymara nationalism is nothing like Serb nationalism. When white oppression is too much to bear, the Aymaras react in a very radical manner. But the Aymaras are also capable of negotiating and allying with others. They’re not going to push for separation from the Bolivian nation state, but they’re going to demand a certain amount of autonomy. For example, they want the right to elect their own indigenous municipal authorities.

NK: Does Evo Morales ever speak Quechua?

MC: In the coca zone, he speaks Spanish and Quechua. He puts on a poncho, which he never used to do. He’s been in politics for twenty years, and only during the last five has he put on a poncho.

NK: Could we see the emergence of the most radical social movements here in Bolivia?

MC: It’s possible. In Bolivia the state has never been able to function without social pressure from below. That’s to say, civil society is permanently organized and constantly exercises pressure on the government. At times, this pressure can become quite radical. But radical in what sense? People may organize a blockade or strike. But it’s not radical in the sense of Central America where you wound up with guerrilla movements. In Bolivia, armed movements have never achieved any kind of importance. The 1952 Revolution was much less bloody than the Cuban and Mexican Revolutions and it was also shorter. It was three days of struggle in the streets and boom!, the oligarchy fell. There’s no culture of long term violence here in Bolivia. On the other hand we do have a tradition of participatory democracy which comes out of the ayllu [a pre-Inca form of political organization based on extended family groups] and labor movement, which de-emphasizes delegation of power towards leaders.

NK: When you speak with the Indians nowadays, do you notice any psychological shift?

MC: Yes. I have noticed a change in my students in the history department, who have campesino origins. Ten years ago, it was difficult to get them to even say their last name. Finally they would say their name, but very slowly. Now it’s different. People say, "I am from such and such a town in the altiplano, and I am an Indian!"

Magdalena Cajias is a historian at the Upper University of San Andres, Bolivia, and producer of the documentary film, "Achacachi, The Aymara Insurgency."

To read my interview, click here. 

Recently, I caught up with Manuel Cabieses, the Director of Punto Final, a Chilean bi-monthly newspaper. During the one hour interview, Cabieses discussed his own background and opposition to the Pinochet government, Chile’s free trade agreement with the U.S., the state of social movements in Chile, Hugo Chavez, China’s rising profile in South America, and the current position of left media in Chile.

NK: Could you tell me a bit about your personal background?

MC: I originally worked in an oil company as a young man. We created a union there, and I was responsible for the labor newspaper. Through the paper I got involved in journalism; I never studied journalism in a formal setting.

NK: How did you get involved in politics?

MC: I first got interested in a party which no longer exists in Chile, which was called Falange Nacional. This was the precursor to the Christian Democratic Party. I got interested in it because my mother was Catholic and friendly with various leaders within the party. I was never a militant however. Then, when I started working I got interested in the Communist Party. I wasn’t such a militant there either, but I got interested in Marxist books. Later, for work related reasons I emigrated to Venezuela, this was during the 1960s. In Venezuela I had contact with the Communist Party of Venezuela which at that time had initiated armed struggle. I later returned to Chile and became more active in the Communist Party. I took up work as a journalist at the Communist Party paper for example. Later I broke with the Communist Party and I became a militant within the Revolutionary Leftist Movement (known by its Spanish acronym MIR). This was up to and even after Pinochet’s military coup in 1973. Later I was imprisoned and expelled from the country. Subsequently I returned in secret to Chile as a MIR militant.

NK: Could you explain a bit about prison and exile?

MC: (long pause). I was detained 2 days after the coup, in the street.

NK: Nearby to your offices here?

MC: Yes, here in downtown. I was in a car. We were all obliged to get out of the vehicle, and someone in the street recognized me. The dictatorship had issued advisories, warning that certain people should hand themselves over, including me. I was imprisoned a little more than 2 years, in different prisons all over the country. Finally I was expelled along with my family. We went to Cuba. I was there for around 4 years and later I returned secretly with my woman, that Senora outside who you saw in my office. We spent almost ten years living in secret here in Chile, working with the MIR. That’s about it in summary.

NK: How strong are social movements here and to what extent can they push the government to the left?

MC: They’re very weak and atomized. The dictatorship, through repression and imposition of its economic model, were able to fracture social movements, and almost succeeded in liquidating any kind of left political movement. The labor unions today are far fewer in number than in the 1970s. It’s unlikely that we’ll see the emergence of a potent social movement here like in other countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador for example.

NK: What about students?

MC: The student movement last year was very strong in the sense that there hadn’t been a movement like that for many years. But intrinsically it wasn’t very strong in terms of organization and wasn’t able to mobilize on a national level. This year the student movement hasn’t advanced at all.

NK: What about the Indians?

MC: After the end of the Pinochet dictatorship, the Mapuche Indians have been politically active on a sporadic basis. But, as with other sectors of society, it’s a very atomized movement and there is no national Mapuche organization. The most radicalized Mapuches have been very beaten back and repressed.

NK: Could there be more social conflict here if poverty increases?

MC: Chilean economic development has reached a threshold. The economy was growing at a rate of 6-7%, but last year it went down to 4%. This year it’s hardly expected that it will significantly increase beyond this rate. The dynamism of the neo liberal, export model, seems to have reached a plateau because Chile lacks necessary infrastructure. Fundamentally, the export model is based on mining, especially copper, the rest is fruit and wood. But there’s no capacity to promote greater development and we lack diversified technology to compete. As a result the economy grows slowly, and a high number of people, some 500,000 individuals, are unemployed on a permanent basis.

NK: Has poverty been reduced?

MC: There has been a reduction in poverty in terms of percentages, but what has advanced more rapidly is extreme wealth concentrated in the hands of a minority. Investors have reaped fabulous profits in the last few years, but meanwhile salaries and pensions have suffered. In this manner, the contradictions between extreme poverty and wealth have been sharpened. At the same time, the political parties have been delegitimized. The same political conditions are being generated here that we observed before the rise of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, or Ecuador on a permanent basis, or Bolivia. These conditions will generate a difficult political and social milieu in future.

NK: How does society view Chile’s free trade agreement with the United States?

MC: There are labor sectors who look favorably upon the treaty. They believe what the media has told them, that the prosperity, this dynamic export economy, will filter down from the top towards the bottom. There are sectors of society which are not numerically insignificant, which have benefited in some way from the export model. For example, in terms of credit. Credit cards didn’t exist here before. But today a great many Chileans, even those earning low salaries, have them. We have also seen massification of cell phones. In Chile there are 14 million cell phones, and the population is some 16 million people. Support for the export model is clearly demonstrated in the electoral arena. Since the end of the Pinochet dictatorship in 1990, between the electoral vote for the Concertacion and the right, more than 90% of Chileans have chosen to support this model. That’s because a political and social alternative hasn’t yet arisen.

NK: What have been the advantages of the model?

MC: There’s been a great modernization, growth in telecommunications, roads, airports, ports, and all sectors linked to export.

NK: Yes, the airport is quite impressive!

MC: If you go out into the countryside, a half hour out of Santiago, you’ll find agro export farms. There has been prosperity in that sense. Each year the companies register an increase on the stock market.

NK: Is there any chance Chile would back out of the free trade agreement with the U.S.?

MC: No, and in fact every day Chile signs a new trade agreement with other countries.

NK: How do you see China’s rising presence economically speaking?

MC: China is becoming more important. One sign of this is the anticipated copper profits from sales to China, amounting to $ 500-600 million dollars. China pays in advance.

NK: What do social movements have to say about China’s rising profile?

MC: Social movements are passive towards these types of issues. There are some labor leaders who are sympathetic towards China because they think it will have a respectful attitude towards Chilean interests. I think they are mistaken. The Chinese are doing business at the same velocity and lack of scruples as the United States.

NK: How strong is left wing journalism here in Chile?

MC: In television there’s nothing, there’s no station that identifies as leftist. There’s a radio station which belongs to the Communist Party, and there’s a few progressive radio stations. In the press there’s only two bi monthlies, El Siglo, of the Communist Party, and Punto Final, both have low circulation. We have no publicity and experience distribution problems. On the internet there’s more diversity but in Chile most people don’t have access as this is just beginning here.

NK: In Venezuela Chavez has created a lot of state television media and there’s been an information battle going on. Is that possible here?

MC: (long pause). You say, here?

NK: Yes (laughs). Are you surprised by my question?

MC: In Venezuela, you have that situation because there’s a government that confronts the private media. Here, the media is completely identified with the government. The government is the Concertacion, but the party shares power with the right. The media meanwhile is totally on the right.

NK: How strong is CNN and U.S. media here in Chile?

MC: Very strong, but amongst the middle and upper middle classes.

NK: Is Telesur (a satellite news station partially funded by Venezuela) beamed here, and could it compete?

MC: There are some regions of the country, for example in the center, where you can receive Telesur and even Cuban TV. Otherwise however, only people who have access to Direct TV can watch Telesur. You need a long range antenna.

NK: Have you ever had any contact with the U.S. Embassy here while working for Punto Final?

MC: I have never had any contact with them, expect for one time when I applied for a visa to visit Puerto Rico. I was turned down. But, the embassy subscribes to Punto Final (laughs).

NK: It seems to me that Chile’s relationship with the U.S. is a bit ambiguous?

MC: I don’t think Chile has criticized the U.S. in a very direct way as some other Latin American governments have done in the past. Chile is located here by a geographical accident, in the Southern Cone of Latin America. With the exception of the Iraq War, Chilean foreign policy is completely identified with U.S. and European interests.

NK: You interviewed Chavez, what was your impression and what do you think will happen as far as Chilean Venezuelan relations?

MC: In 1994 I met Chavez in Chile. He was on a tour of Latin America and in Chile no one wanted to receive him. No leftist party wanted to associate itself with him because he had this image of being a military coup plotter. But we at Punto Final interviewed him. We went to his hotel and did a two page spread. These days I have a very high opinion of Chavez. I think he’s matured as far as his political ideas, he’s made them more solid, firmer. Sometimes to my mind he uses strident rhetoric when characterizing certain foreign leaders and doesn’t think before he acts. As far as Chilean Venezuelan relations, I don’t expect much. I think optimally what one might hope is that Chile may retain a respectful attitude towards Venezuela. But, I don’t think it will be friendly. Perhaps friendly between high profile politicians like Bachelet and Chavez, but this won’t extend to deep relations between the two governments.

Manuel Cabieses is the Director of Punto Final, a Chilean bi-monthly newspaper.

When Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez recently took his oath of office for a second term, he swore it in the name of Jesus Christ, who he called "the greatest socialist of history."  It's hardly an accident that Chavez would hark on Christianity in addressing his people.  For years, Venezuela has been a religious battleground, with Chavez pursuing a combative relationship with the Catholic Church. 

 

In Venezuela, Catholics have a potent political voice and make up about 70% of the country's population.  Ever since taking office in 1999, Chavez has repeatedly clashed with the clergy.  The President frequently chastised Venezuelan bishops, accusing them of complicity with corrupt administrations that preceded his rule.

 

To a certain extent, a clash was inevitable.  Unlike some other Latin American countries which were characterized by so-called liberation theology, the Venezuelan Church has never had a leftist tendency.  According to observers, as few as one in 10 priests identify with the left and out of more than 50 bishops only a handful are sympathetic to Chavez.

 

The Venezuelan Church: A Bastion of Conservatism

 

Despite the conservative nature of the Church, relations between the clergy and the Chavez government got off to a reasonably good start.  After he was first elected in 1998, Chavez proclaimed his devotion to the Church and Catholic social doctrine.  Venezuelan bishops in turn supported the social programs that Chavez had outlined during his presidential campaign.  Bishops welcomed Chavez's calls to end corruption, to foster a more equitable distribution of wealth, transparent voting, and an end to the ruling class' special privileges. 

 

Thing went awry, however, in July, 1999 when Chavez personally met with Monsignor Baltazar Porras at the headquarters of the Episcopal Conference.  Porras, the Archbishop of the Andean city of Merida and chairman of the Episcopal Conference, met with Chavez for two hours. Emerging from the meeting, Porras declared that the Venezuelan government had opted to cut its traditional subsidies to the Church by up to 80%.  The new rules, Porras said, would oblige clerical authorities to adjust to "the new realities of the country, and to figure out how to search for self financing."  Porras became a vocal critic of the regime; in Caracas he received the backing of the Papal Nuncio, Monsignor André Dupuy.

 

Another point of friction was Chavez's calls for a new Constitution.  Church leaders feared that Chavez's secret agenda in calling for the new constitution was the imposition of a Cuban-style communist regime.  Porras declared that Chavez was fomenting "fear and hate" and dividing Venezuelans in his campaign to draft a constitution.

 

Traveling to Merida

 

Recently I was in Caracas to give a talk and decided to take a night bus to Merida, a city located about seven hundred kilometers south-west of the capital.  I was eager to learn more about the Church in Venezuela, and how its relations had deteriorated so dramatically with Chavez.

 

I drifted off to sleep in the bus.  Climbing up and down through the mountains, the landscape was dotted with cacti.  By the next day, exhausted from the trip, I made my way to a posada or inn near the Central Square.  Five years earlier, I'd stayed in the same place while pursuing research for my dissertation on the foreign oil industry in Venezuela. 

 

Merida is a favored tourist destination and feels like a Venezuelan version of Switzerland with hotels, cyber cafes and vegetarian restaurants appealing to foreigners.  In the main square of the city, Venezuelan hippies in their twenties play guitar and sell artisan work.  Despite its traditional religious outlook, Merida also has a university which has had a long tradition of leftist politics.

 

A few days after recuperating from my long trip, I headed to the Cathedral in Merida's central square.  There, I spoke with Monsignor Alfredo Torres, General Vicar of the local Archdiocese.  A long time fixture of the local church establishment, Torres went into the seminary when he was fifteen years old. 

 

When I asked Torres how relations had deteriorated so badly between Chavez and Porras, the local clergyman explained, "The militarist, socialistic bent of the government was always a critical point for the Archbishop."

 

Church-Military Relations Break Down

 

By 2000, the role of the military had certainly become a controversial political issue.  During his first year in power, Chavez, himself a former paratrooper, faced a very unenviable political environment.  Congress and the Supreme Court were in the hands of the opposition, as were the majority of mayoral districts and governorships.  Meanwhile, oil stood at only $7 a barrel. 

In desperation, Chavez called on the armed forces to carry out ambitious public works projects---the so-called Plan Bolivar 2000.  The plan proved reportedly divisive within the military, with some soldiers feeling uncomfortable in their new social role. 

 

The Church missed no opportunity to criticize Chavez's military policy.  Caracas Archbishop Ignacio Velasco remarked publicly that "something is making the armed forces nervous."  Velasco recommended that the armed forces should meet to decide whether soldiers should have the right to express themselves openly. 

 

Furthermore, Velasco remarked sarcastically, the Minister of Defense, Ismael Hurtado Soucre, always tried to smooth over problems and make believe that nothing was wrong within the military ranks.  That elicited a sarcastic rejoinder in turn from Hurtado, who remarked that the Church certainly had its own share of problems.

 

Chavez vs. Castillo Lara

 

Chavez did not assuage the Church's fears when he declared famously that several bishops and the Vatican's former representative in Venezuela, Cardinal Rosalio Castillo Lara, had allied with the country's "rancid oligarchy."

 

"It would appear," said Chavez, "that a very small group of bishops has something personal against the President."

 

Even more inflammatory still, Chavez suggested that priests such as Castillo ought to subject themselves to an exorcism because "the devil has snuck into their clerical robes."  

 

In a personal riposte, Chavez sought to link Castillo with earlier corrupt administrations.  "Where were you when the bankers robbed more than $7,000,000,000 under the government of Rafael Caldera, your personal friend, during the financial crisis of 1994?  Did you say anything when the police massacred the people on the 27th of February [during the Caracazo, massive urban riots in Caracas in 1989]?"

 

Incensed, Castillo compared Chavez to Italian dictator Benito Mussolini.

 

Meanwhile, the Church grew increasingly more concerned about the Constitution, which failed to guarantee the protection of life beginning at conception.

 

War of Words Escalates: Vargas Tragedy

 

In the midst of the escalating battle over the Constitution, disaster struck when rains hit the state of Vargas, on the coast near Caracas.  I had the occasion to visit the area over this past summer, and what one is immediately struck by is the precarious housing built on steep hillsides.  When the rains hit, they created massive landslides that swept away everything.  A catastrophe of epic proportions, the Vargas rains led to the deaths of between 10 and 20,000 people.

 

In Vargas, I spoke with people who were still, seven years later, waiting to be evacuated.  Living in dilapidated housing and mired in poverty, their plight was certainly depressing.  Nevertheless, it should be said that the government carried out a Herculean job, evacuating 190,000 people.  I visited one recently built housing complex, Ciudad Miranda, which housed many of the refugees.

 

At a moment of crisis, the Church insinuated itself into the Vargas crisis by making critical public statements.  In a reference to Chavez, Archbishop Velasco remarked that the Vargas tragedy was the "wrath of God," because "the sin of pride is serious and nature itself reminds us that we don't have all the power or abilities."

 

Chavez's Papal Gambit

 

As prominent Church figures such as Castillo and Velasco became more combative, Chavez sought to override local opposition by traveling personally to Rome where he met with Pope John Paul II.  Venezuela has attached much importance to its relationship to the Vatican and has an Ambassador there. 

 

Chavez took advantage of his Papal interview to confess.  "It was extraordinary for me, a practicing Catholic," Chavez remarked, "…to have words with the Pope."

 

Chavez, who discussed controversial issues with the Pope such as abortion, also sought to court the Pontiff by emphasizing common concerns such as the "savage" neo-liberal economic order, "which had brought people to misery, especially in the Third World."

 

A month after his trip to Rome, the Papal Nuncio in Caracas, Leonardo Sandri, brought Chavez a verbal message from the Pope regarding the constitutional process in Venezuela.  According to Sandri, the Sacred See expressed its concerns about guaranteeing life from its original conception within Venezuela's new constitution. Later, Chavez met with Archbishop Velasco, who also expressed his concerns about the right to life.

 

Church-State Relations Break Down in Merida

 

Back in Merida, I query Torres about the breakdown in relations.

 

"Here in the archdiocese," Torres remarked, "we got into a very precarious financial situation.  We receive money from the parishes, cultural and academic activities and the well organized Archdiocese museum.  We get financing from private companies and banks, but the government doesn't help."

 

Torres said that the government had withdrawn funding from the archdiocese and seminary.  He claimed, moreover, that the Church had experienced some financial turmoil.  The Church, he said, had media enterprises in Merida including print, radio, and TV. 

 

However, he declared that recently El Vigilante, a Church newspaper, had been forced to close for economic reasons.  Meanwhile, the TV and radio station had very few financial resources to continue their work.

 

There were other disputes early on which set the course for future conflict.  For example, a quarrel over the Sor Juana Ines de la Cruz Hospital Foundation, which had been managed by the Merida clergy since the mid 1990s, turned nasty. 

 

"The Church managed the local hospital," Torres explained.  "The government provided the money for the staff.  The archbishop sought equipment abroad.  But, the government disregarded our contract after Chavez assumed power."

 

In Merida: Porras vs. Chavez

 

According to the government, Porras was corrupt.  The Merida State Governor, Florencio Porras [a long time Chavista, retired Captain and active participant in Chavez's aborted 1992 coup against then President Carlos Andres Perez], declared that public funding as well as private donations which were supposed to go towards the maintenance of the hospital had disappeared and Baltazar Porras was responsible. 

 

Baltazar Porras shot back that there was a "witch hunt" against him.  Chavez was personally apprised of the matter and the Attorney General proceeded with an investigation into Porras' bank accounts.

 

Dramatically, the police as well as the Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services, a special police and intelligence force [known by its Spanish acronym Disip] moved into the hospital and confiscated the facility's records.  The action was coordinated by federal authorities including the office of the national Comptroller General.   

 

In a further move which antagonized the Church, state authorities actually took over the management of the Hospital Foundation.  Torres bristles when discussing the incident.  Porras, he says, was accused of being a thief when in actuality it was the state which had behaved crookedly.  The authorities, he said, confiscated the hospital's equipment. 

 

Even as the government moved to clamp down on the Church in Merida, Chavez himself was heating up the rhetoric.  The President accused Porras of being an "adeco [members of the discredited and corrupt political party Accion Democratica, which had ruled the country for years prior to Chavez's election] with a cassock."  Adding fuel to the fire, Chavez remarked that the Church was "an accomplice in corruption."

 

Papal Intrigue

 

Chavez's holy war threatened to spill over and destabilize relations with the Vatican.  In late 2000, John Paul II remarked that "a democracy without values becomes authoritarianism."  The Pope made his remarks during an accreditation ceremony for the Venezuelan Ambassador to the Vatican, Ignacio Quintana. 

 

In Venezuela, politicians tried to make sense of the Pope's comments.  Jose Vicente Rangel, the Minister of External Relations, declared that he agreed with John Paul's statement.  "In that sense I am more Popish than the Pope," Rangel said.

 

In speaking with the press, Quintana assured journalists that the Pope "respected" the Bolivarian Revolution.  The new ambassador claimed, furthermore, that high authorities within the Vatican sympathized with Chavez and the social changes taking place in Venezuela. 

 

Lurking in the background however, Porras added his own spin to John Paul's address.  When the Pope said "a democracy without values," Porras said, the Pontiff was clearly referring to Venezuela.

 

While it's unclear what the Pope exactly meant, the Vatican sought to appease conservatives by giving the nod to Ignacio Velasco.  In early 2001 the Archbishop of Caracas was named a Cardinal by the Pope.  As such, he represented a dangerous potential enemy for Chavez. 

In a gesture of congratulations for his new position, Quintana, the Venezuelan Ambassador to the Vatican, gave the Caracas Archbishop a pectoral cross made out of gold. 

 

Chavez himself traveled back to the Vatican shortly after the 9-11 attacks to meet with the Pope.  In an effort to smooth relations and emphasize common ground, Chavez remarked, "The Pope has declared in the last few days something that we have also said: that we do not support war…The war is against hunger…The Pope has said that one cannot respond to violence with more war.  I also say the same, for that reason I came to seek his guidance."

 

Lead up to coup

 

In late 2001, Chavez was confronting an angry opposition led by old guard labor, business and oil executives at the state run oil company, PdVSA.  The Church seemed to be moving towards the opposition camp.  In January, 2002 Andre Dupuy, the Papal Nuncio, told Chavez that he was worried about a possible "radicalization" of the internal conflict in Venezuela. 

 

Chavez in turn shot back that Dupuy was interfering in the country's political affairs.  In another address the same month, Chavez characterized the Church as a "tumor" on society.  A few days later, perhaps recanting that he had gone too far, Chavez invited Venezuelan bishops to participate in a dialogue, an offer the clergy rejected.

 

From there it was all downhill.  The Church joined forces with the CTV, a large labor union, and Fedecamaras, the business federation.  The outspoken Porras declared that, "governments that are democratically elected which do not comply with their promises become illegitimate."

 

The President of the Episcopal Conference added that anti-government strikes and protests, which had intensified, were not part of a conspiracy but the consequence of Chavez's own dogged behavior.

 

Chavez responded with more hyperbolic rhetoric of his own, suggesting that archbishop Velasco "pray a little" and "look into his conscience."  Speaking during his radio and TV show, Alo, Presidente!, Chavez criticized Velasco's interference in the political arena.  Chavez praised the Pope, while criticizing what he called "a small group of clergy that doesn't amount to more than five people."

 

The Chavez/Porras Interview

 

It wasn't long, however, before the "small group" actively moved into the camp of those seeking to overturn Chavez's government.  During the April 2002 coup, prominent Catholics such as Velasco sided with the opposition against the president.  Velasco, who had earlier met with Chavez during the constitutional controversy, even offered his residence as a meeting place for the coup plotters. 

 

What is more, he signed the "Carmona decree" that swept away Venezuela's democratic institutions.  Senior Catholic bishops themselves attended the inauguration ceremony for Pedro Carmona, Venezuela's Dictator-For-a-Day.   

 

In an ironic twist, Chavez personally called Porras from the presidential palace, Miraflores, and the Archbishop agreed to act as the President's personal custodian and guarantor in the midst of the coup.  On April 12, Chavez was brought to Tiuna Fort, a military facility in Caracas. 

There, at 3:40 PM Chavez was received at the doors by Porras himself as well as José Luis Azuaje, the Secretary General of the Episcopal Conference.  According to Porras, who was later interviewed by the Spanish newspaper El Pais, the two spoke for hours in the midst of the tense political situation.

 

"He [Chavez] was serene," Porras explained, "very serene, and spoke to us in an intimate, confessional tone…We wanted to give him strength and energy to examine the present and to be able to look towards the future."

 

Porras added, "Chavez asked me for forgiveness for the way he had treated me."  According to the Archbishop, Chavez moreover expressed sorrow that he had not been able to achieve a more amicable relationship with the Church.

 

Poisonous Relations Return

 

After his interview with Porras, Chavez was taken to the remote island of Orchila.  Cardinal Velasco later confirmed that he too went to Orchila, where he spoke with the Venezuelan President.  According to Velasco, Chavez forgave himself and the two reportedly even prayed together.

 

Shortly thereafter Chavez was triumphantly restored to power.  Later, he clutched a crucifix when giving evidence to a televised parliamentary commission investigating the deaths of 17 marchers who participated in an anti-government demonstration and later coup attempt.

Meanwhile, the Episcopal Conference drafted a statement condemning the "tragic occurrences" of April, 2002.  Bishops stated, however, that "in the current moment of uncertainty and tension it is necessary for the government and society to open a space for real dialogue."  Porras added that the goodwill of the president should be demonstrated with concrete deeds.

 

In an effort to appease the Church, Chavez later requested that the Church help to mediate in the ongoing conflict with the political opposition, which heated up later that year during an oil lock out.  Bizarrely, the opposition called on the Church to exorcise Chavez in an effort to counter possession by demons. 

 

Velasco, who apparently thought the request went too far, ruled out the possibility but was still critical of the government.  In the midst of the escalating war of words, John Paul II called for peace and reconciliation.

 

Whatever goodwill had existed following the coup quickly dissipated.  Chavez later stated that "there are bishops from the Catholic Church who knew a coup was on the way, and they used church installations to bring coup plotters together ... those clerics are immoral and spokesmen for the opposition." 

 

Meanwhile, a government commission recommended that the Attorney General's office open an investigation into Cardinal Velasco and Baltazar Porras for presumed participation in the April coup.  Velasco claimed to have received death threats.  When the Cardinal died about a year after the coup, removing one of the key opposition figures in the Church, riot police had to disperse crowds with rubber bullets at the funeral. 

 

As the funeral procession proceeded, Chavez supporters shouted insults such as "Justice has been done---he was a coup plotter!", and "The rats bury their rat!" Reportedly, pro-government demonstrators also stormed the cathedral where Velasco lay in state. 

 

Merida: an Embattled City

 

During the tumultuous days after the coup, Porras found himself besieged even within his home town of Merida.  A manifesto soon appeared in the city, published by the "Revolutionary Justice, Truth and Dignity Movement." 

 

In the pamphlet, the group declared that Porras was persona non grata, a traitor and a political fanatic.  The manifesto claimed that Porras was "a destructive, disruptive, agitating, subversive element" for society.  The group also attacked Velasco, who was referred to as "Judas."

 

In late 2002, Porras was verbally insulted by Chavez followers in the Merida State Legislature.  Porras had been invited to speak on the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Merida Cardinal Jose Humberto Quintero.  Chavez officials from the State Legislature held banners and interrupted the proceedings by shouting. 

 

I have always been struck by the religious tone in the city of Merida.  When I was first there as a graduate student, in 2001, I observed many shops selling religious artifacts and candles.  Over this past summer, when I returned, I saw the main church full of people during Sunday mass.  Speaking with local residents in Merida, I learned that the city had been touched by political change. 

 

The woman who managed the posada where I was staying remarked that social programs initiated after the coup had made a modest difference in the lives of meridenos.  Her children, for example, were now attending some of the new Bolivarian schools (she complained, however, that parents had to shell out money of their own to maintain the school).

Poor people, she said, were now receiving food at the local government sponsored soup kitchens.  Near to the posada on a side street, I saw a cooperatively run restaurant sponsored by the government's vuelvan caras or "turning lives around" program.

 

To get more information about changes in Merida society, I headed to a government building on the main square, near the Cathedral.  Peering around inside, I noticed that the offices were plastered with posters of Chavez, Che Guevara and Simon Bolivar. 

 

Upstairs, I spoke with Ruben Aguila Cerati, Director of Electoral Politics for Chavez's MVR party in the State of Merida, and a former member of the Venezuelan Communist Party.  Cerati, a colorful, jolly man who had been a guerrilla fighter himself, explained to me that gender relations had changed dramatically. 

 

"Today we have 153,000 meridenos registered in the MVR [Chavez's political party].  Fifty three percent of these people are women.  In the political assemblies, women are the dominant force.  I can't say there is no machismo here in Merida, but women have been liberated."

 

Merida Church and Social Reforms

 

Not everyone has embraced the social changes in the city, however.  Back in the main cathedral, Torres spoke of chronic poverty in Merida's barrios, remarking that "change for the better has not reached the people, who continue to search for a means of survival."

 

Torres, echoing the criticisms of the opposition, also touched on the issue of insecurity.  "There's been an increase in criminal activity," he said.  "Merida used to be a very safe area." 

"That's the government's fault?" I asked.

 

"The government hasn't acted to adopt the necessary measures to stop crime," he replied. "People are afraid to go out at night.  You didn't notice this before, there wasn't so much violence." 

 

I asked Torres about the controversial role of Cuban doctors who had come to Venezuela to provide medical assistance for poor residents.

 

"We think that…this assistance has not resolved the health problem amongst the people," Torres answered.  He criticized conditions in a local hospital, remarking that "the service is horrible; people need to buy sheets, medicine and other necessities."

 

"Would you prefer that the Cuban doctors leave the country?" I asked.

 

"The doctors have helped," Torres conceded.  "However, the overall health situation hasn't changed." 

 

I turned the discussion towards education, a historically contentious issue between the Church and Chavez authorities.  Torres admitted that the Bolivarian schools had set up new cafeterias, a positive development.  In an echo of what the Senora had said in the posada, however, he criticized the government for not providing necessary assistance to local schools.

"A sign of this phenomenon," Torres exclaimed, "is that if you want a place in a Catholic school they are all filled up.  Everyone wants to get a spot." 

 

Government and Church Spar Over Land

 

Another controversial measure pushed by Chavez has been land reform.  I had wanted to tour the countryside but unfortunately fell sick with an acute case of bronchitis and had to curtail my trip.  I did, however, query Torres about the issue.

 

The clergyman voiced serious reservations.  In the wake of the land reform, he said, the campesinos had become radicalized and this had led to a serious confrontation "and an invasion of farms which brings problems and puts a break on development."

 

I wanted to get Torres' views on land reform as well.  Before conducting my interview with the local priest, I had read an article in La Frontera, a local opposition paper, arguing that local cattle ranchers had been obliged to hire hit men to defend themselves, ostensibly against kidnapping. 

 

The Minister of Interior accused the ranchers of inflating the kidnapping figures in an effort to justify the hiring of hit men, who had in turn killed campesinos [the secretary of the campesino federation has said that his colleagues have been killed by the hit men "as a result of the campesino struggle for land"].

 

Torres conceded that violence had escalated in the countryside.  However, he said the government was responsible for encouraging an overall climate of delinquent behavior which did not help the situation. 

 

"I think all of this government rhetoric starts to generate violence," he said.   

 

Across the square I spoke with Cerati about the rural situation.  He began first by extolling Chavez's various "mission" programs which had transformed the countryside.

 

"The campesinos now know how to read and write," he exclaimed enthusiastically.  "Here there is no longer any illiteracy: that is extraordinary."

 

The discussion then turned to health matters, and I queried Cerati about the Cuban doctors.  "Campesinos," he noted, "who had never seen a doctor now have them right at their side.  The Cuban doctors have incorporated themselves into the peasantry.  The campesinos are not suspicious of communism."

 

Unlike Torres, who blamed the government for rural violence, Cerati pointed the finger at powerful interests.  "Campesinos," he said, "have been killed and assassinated by these landlords.  This has happened in the south of Lake Maracaibo, in Barinas, and in Yaracuy.  The land belongs to the campesinos, the revolutionaries." 

 

"Merida has traditionally been very conservative and dominated by the Church," I remarked.  "How do you see the situation in the countryside, is it the Church supporting the landlords, and the government supporting the campesinos?"

 

"The clergy has always been right wing," Cerati answered.  "It's always represented the oligarchies, the bourgeoisie.  But, now the majority of the lower tier clergy are with the Bolivarian process.  There's an incredible difference between the clergy here in the city of Merida and the priests out in the countryside." 

 

Castillo Lara Turns Up the Pressure

 

Porras meanwhile backed efforts to recall Chavez as president.  In 2003 he remarked that Chavez had abused his power and his regime was a profound "social failure."  Chavez shot back that Porras had become a spokesperson for the opposition and should take off his cassock because he was not a dignified man of Christ.  "God is with the Bolivarian Revolution," Chavez said, "and here there are people with cassocks who oppose the political changes that we are carrying out."

 

In his own retort, Porras responded that in Venezuela peace and goodwill had deteriorated, while poverty, unemployment, corruption, violence, homicides and kidnapping had increased. 

Porras warned about the rise of cults inspired by 20th century fascist leaders, and went so far as to equate Chavismo with Franco, Nazism, and fascism.  Porras' frontal offensive was echoed by other Church leaders such as Cardinal Rosalio Castillo Lara, who called for civil disobedience against the Chavez government. 

 

With Velasco now gone, high Church officials looked isolated within the new political environment, characterized by a fractured opposition and ascendant Chavez.      Porras, though, denied any significant political division within Church ranks.  The archbishop met personally with John Paul II, who was reportedly very worried about political conflict in Venezuela and sought a peaceful solution to the polarization.

 

Pope Benedict: A New Direction?

 

After John Paul II died in April, 2005 Chavez again went to Rome, this time to meet with the new Pope Benedict XVI.  According to Father Pedro Freites, who heads the Venezuelan School in Rome and had formerly been the head of Vatican radio for Latin America and the Caribbean, Castillo Lara did not represent the Church when he called for civil disobedience in Venezuela. 

 

However, in an interview with the Venezuelan newspaper El Nacional he remarked that Benedict was "aware of the situation in Venezuela and of the serious danger posed to democracy."  Castillo Lara, he added, had ties with all cardinals and had been the governor of the Vatican State.  He had submitted reports, and the Pope was concerned that a dictatorship might be imposed in Venezuela.  Ratzinger himself, Freites remarked, was close to Castillo Lara and had also spoken with Porras.

 

During his meeting with the Venezuelan leader, Benedict handed Chavez a letter outlining the Church's concerns.  In the note, the Pope raised fears that religious education was being squeezed out of some Venezuelan schools.  He also touched upon Venezuela's public health programs, expressing concern that the right to life be maintained "from its inception."

Chavez reportedly sought to overcome his government's differences with the Church.  At the end of their meeting, Chavez presented the Pope with a portrait of Simon Bolivar, the mythical Venezuelan independence leader who Chavez idolizes.  The picture bore an inscription from Bolivar's will, saying that he remained, at long last, a Catholic.

 

Following the meeting, Chavez declared that the crisis between his government and the Church had its "limits in time, space, and personalities."  The conflict that had existed, Chavez continued, had to do with a very small group of people.  Moreover, he was committed to "turn the page" and start over, owing to his "sense of responsibility" towards Venezuela and the doctrine of Christ. 

 

Church Hardliners Isolated

 

Indeed, Chavez had just reason to feel relieved.  Already, the Church had seemed to adopt a more conciliatory stance when it replaced the hard line French conservative Papal nuncio, Monsignor André Dupuy, with the Italian Giacinto Berlocco.  Reportedly, the new nuncio was instructed to seek a less confrontational policy towards Chavez.  

 

When Castillo Lara said that Venezuelans should "deny recognition" to the Chavez government, Berlocco stated that the Venezuelan Cardinal did not reflect the position of the Catholic Church in Venezuela.  Chavez praised Berlocco for carrying out what he called "quiet and patient work." 

 

What's more, after his visit with the new Pope Chavez also expressed pleasure with other new Church appointments such as Cardinal Jorge Urosa Savino, who in his first address called on the Church to work for unity and understanding in Venezuela, and Ubaldo Santana, the new president of the Venezuelan Episcopal Conference.

 

In the political reshuffle, conservatives had been sidelined.  In the race to pick a new cardinal for Venezuela, Savino, the bishop of Maracaibo, had edged out his more outspoken competitor, Porras.  According to the Venezuelan newspaper El Universal, some bishops opposed Porras for taking such a radical anti-Chavez stance which had imperiled relations with the government. 

 

In early 2006, Castillo Lara once more attacked Chavez but his influence seemed to be much reduced.  Speaking in the west of the country before thousands of worshippers participating in a pilgrimage to the Virgin Mary, the Cardinal said the country was undoubtedly becoming a dictatorship.  When Chavez claimed there was a conspiracy in Rome to damage his government, Archbishop Urosa quickly grew concerned and condemned Castillo Lara's remarks. 

 

Moving To the Future

 

On my recent trip, I traveled with a peace delegation to Charallave, a town outside of Caracas.  Sitting in a Mennonite church, we spoke with Jorge Martin, president of a local group of pastors.

 

"Chavez," he told us, "has said that Church work should complement government efforts.  We recognize that the church needs to do social work and that the church has a role in this area."

Indeed, even as Chavez has sparred with the Church, Protestants have become a key pillar of the president's political support.  Back in Caracas, in fact, our delegation had observed a Protestant church which prepared government provided food for the poor.  Martin called Pat Robertson's calls to assassinate Chavez "unfortunate." He said that in Venezuela, Protestants of all denominations had rejected the minister's comments. 

 

Over the last few years, Chavez has done his utmost to cultivate the support of Protestants, which make up 29% of the population.  He even declared that he was no longer a Catholic but a member of the Christian Evangelical Council. 

 

In his speeches, Chavez hardly flees from religious themes and frequently quotes from the Bible.  Bizarrely, he also tells his supporters in speeches that Christ was an anti-imperialist.

Chavez's rhetoric, not surprisingly, has alarmed the Catholic clergy.  Freites believes that Chavez's long-term goal is to "create a parallel Church…that identifies with the revolutionary process."

 

While such views may be exaggerated, it is impossible to overlook religious overtones in everyday Venezuelan politics.  During my visit to a government housing project in Ciudad Miranda outside Caracas, I spotted banners on the street reading, "With Chavez, Christian Socialism."

Lights, Camera, Chávez!  (from a 2007 interview)

Lorena Almarza is the director of Villa del Cine, a Venezuelan state sponsored film company located near the town of Guarenas, in the state of Miranda.

 

NK: What is your professional background?

 

LA: I studied social and political psychology. I was particularly interested in culture as a means of encouraging development and community organization. I did a lot of readings from Gramsci and Freyre. I´m originally from Barquisimeto, where I used to visit different film clubs. Later I came to Caracas to study psychology in the Central University. When I came to Caracas I started to work as an usher. After that I started to work on organizing film festivals. I helped to put on an international film festival for children and youth. Seven years ago, I started to work with the Bolivarian schools. We developed a project which brought movies into schools, and we provided manuals explaining how children could interpret images and psychological profiles of the different characters.

 

NK: Can you explain a bit about the structure of Villa del Cine?

 

LA: The state is doing something very experimental with Villa del Cine, we don´t deny it. How could the state, with such a bureaucratic structure, demonstrate that it was capable of attracting talent and start to produce material? It was a matter of getting people together with a certain amount of expertise, and form there form work teams. The state began to invest in film infrastructure. A large part of Venezuelan film had been produced abroad. Villa del Cine came about so that we could film here.

 

NK: Is all this development pretty recent, under Chavez?

 

LA: The Ministry of Culture was just created a year and a half ago. Before that, it was the National Advisory on Culture, this had a very low budget which was unable to stimulate the creation of Venezuelan cinema. The National Advisory on Culture financed some production in Caracas. The films also received funding from Cenac, the National Autonomous Center of Cinematography, also a state run entity. It was a policy based on providing funding, and rather minor funding, rather than a policy of incentives which would spur the creation or productive film development in Venezuela. With the arrival of the minister of Culture, Francisco Cesto, new policies were undertaken. He began to encourage the creation of audio visual cooperatives. The idea was that these groups would bring proposals to the table, and we would find out what aspects might be of interest to the state.

It´s all about the transformation of the state, and how people might become participants in the development of film, through their own art. The state also provided incentives for cooperatives with the idea that they might acquire equipment. In other words, whether or not they got state financing, they could have the means to produce film. The state also put out an open call for documentaries. We realize that Venezuela should change, from a society which funds and takes care of everything, to a new inclusive society where the country can achieve social modes of production. That´s to say, we want a film policy which is not just about providing resources, which is no doubt important. The state should also provide the physical and technical infrastructure for production and distribution. So we started to get to work. Now we have the Film Law. In Venezuela, 98% of what gets shown is Hollywood fare. So, the possibility that our own films, which were very few, could reach the screen, were limited. So, it was established by law that 20% of films that are shown should be Venezuelan. Moreover, theaters should donate a percentage of their ticket revenue to a special fund to promote Venezuelan film. The distributor is also obliged to provide money to this fund. In essence, we´ve developed an entire legal and protectionist framework related to production. With the idea of spurring domestic production, we also created mobile audio visual production units. We were able to involve lots of people who had expertise in TV and film. Specifically, we attracted directors, who had done all the necessary training, but who lacked opportunities to direct, and also young people who had done experimental work.

 

NK: Just Venezuelans?

 

LA: We have involved some people from other countries but who are resident in Venezuela.

 

NK: Cubans?

 

LA: No, we had one Cuban who did a documentary series, but he´s no longer here. He made close to four productions with us. In general however the majority of the people are Venezuelan.

 

NK: Do you specialize particularly in historical themes?

 

LA: Not necessarily, though last year we celebrated the bicentennial anniversary of the arrival of Francisco de Miranda upon his return to Venezuela by producing a film about the this early fighter for Venezuelan independence.

 

NK: How are decisions made about film production, is it a collective decision?

 

LA: Yes, as a matter of fact things are organized horizontally in the Ministry of Culture. We work as a cabinet.

 

NK: Will you produce more movies on historical themes, as these figures are very important for Chavez symbolically?

 

LA: There was a complete ignorance of history here and it was impossible to relate history to the present day. I believe it´s important to take history as an important reference point for the development and construction of Venezuela. This year, in addition to working on Miranda, we´re also doing a film about Zamora, the campesino leader. Currently, the government is retaking lands, and it´s important to pay attention to what´s going on, but we need to remember this is part of a long process. We think Zamora was an emblematic figure who stood for liberty and land. We´re going to make a TV series on both figures as well as a feature length documentary film. You could see these films in any shopping mall along with Hollywood fare. The idea is to diversify the big screen.

 

NK: How easy is it to compete with Hollywood in Venezuela?

 

LA: For us, globalization is homogenization. I think we need to give people the option to choose.

 

NK: How has the construction of Villa del Cine proceeded?

 

LA: It cost us 20 million bolivares to construct these installations. We still have a lot of things to do, because everything has to be up to international standards, so that whatever gets produced here can circulate domestically or internationally. So, if there´s a production in Colombia, or Brazil, which requires post-production services, the idea is that film makers don´t look towards Los Angeles, but to Venezuela as a means of handling these services. And, film makers should have the guarantee that they will obtain the same quality and sound mix which they would have obtained in Los Angeles.

 

NK: So, the idea is to bring other Latin American directors to work here?

 

LA: Yes, it´s a good possibility, either through provision of services or through post-production interests. We have received a proposal from Miguel Litin, a Chilean documentary film maker. He is one of the most prestigious film makers in Latin America. The proposal has Chilean and Brazilian participation and has to do with concentration and torture camps set up by Pinochet in Chile. This is a story which should be of interest to all Latin Americans.

 

NK: How do you award funding to film projects?

 

LA: The National Film Center can only provide 30% of the budget on a given film. When the state gives more than 50%, it´s no longer independent. So, Cenac is trying to create incentives, through public calls and public commissions, to select projects. That state can then guarantee that 70% of the remaining funds could be financed through co-production. Venezuela can present the project to Ibermedia, which is a fund which Venezuela contributes to. This is a fund directed at cinematic production amongst Ibero American countries. So, all projects which get 30% from Cenac can then request funding from Ibermedia.

 

NK: But, Hollywood is a multi-million dollar industry, how can you compete?

 

LA: I don´t think it´s about competing economically. I believe we´re attending to the necessity of encouraging other types of films for the big screen. Chavez has spoken about the battle of ideas. Film is a tool, which can be useful when it comes to the combat of ideas.

 

NK: You really see it that way, as combat?

 

LA: How does the U.S. view us? Just as it does the blacks in its own country, as prostitutes, as drug smugglers. As long as we can show who we are, as Venezuelans, or people from Latin America, we´re counteracting the influence of Hollywood.

 

NK: What kinds of film have you shot, and where do you shoot?

 

LA: We work in all 24 states in Venezuela. In 2005-6 we shot 357 productions. We shot TV series addressing educational developments and changes in local schools. But we also shot series about poets, sculptors, and artisans. We have series about contemporary political activists. We have films about Indians, about music. In 2007 we´ll be producing a lot of material for TV. We got some teams together and we´re working on some fictional films.

 

NK: How many people do you have working here?

 

LA: Right now, directly we have close to 200 people. But the Miranda project has extras as well.

 

NK: Have you ever spoken directly with Chavez?

 

LA: Chavez was with us on the day of the Villa del Cine inauguration. And before that we had the opportunity to speak with him as there were some conversations between the Ministry of Culture and Chavez.

 

NK: I see there are political murals in Caracas and Plains music on the radio, does this all form part of a coherent cultural policy?

 

LA: Yes, there´s a coherent policy. But, it´s not just Plains music on the radio. The Law of Social Responsibility states that Venezuelan music in general should be played.

 

NK: Some Hollywood actors identify with the Bolivarian process such as Danny Glover. Will you hire them?

 

LA: We have a very fraternal relationship with Glover. He came here to Villa del Cine in 2006. He´s interested in developing some productions. As a matter of fact Glover helped to finance a film in Africa about African countries and debt. So, in addition to being an important figure in the Afro-American community, he supports Third World cinema.

 

NK: And no other Hollywood actors?

 

LA: No, up until now only Danny Glover.

 

NK: What are the obstacles moving forward, does the opposition attack you for being ideological?

 

LA: Whatever project Chavez supports, the opposition will attack it.

 

NK: Could they even launch an economic boycott of your films?

 

LA: Yes, probably. We don´t think our project on Miranda is very controversial, but many have claimed that our vision of Miranda is ideological. We can´t figure it out.

 

NK: Do you seek to contribute to the local economy?

 

LA: We decided to make all our own costumes. We decided not to buy the costumes but to employ costume makers from Guarenas who work in their own workshops. 40% of our staff is from Guarenas, and progressively we want to incorporate even more people from the area. We made 200 pairs of shoes for the Miranda production, we got artisans and leather workers to make them. The workers were organized in cooperatives.

 

NK: To what extent does Villa del Cine have to do with other forms of cultural nationalism in the Andes?

 

LA: One of the most vital issues has to do with integration, that is how do we relate to other countries and our common history. The peasant struggle is not unique to Venezuela. There´s also a peasant struggle in Ecuador, in Bolivia. The indigenous struggle across the continent is something which unites us. We´ve been colonized for more than 500 years. I think South American governments are attaching more importance to indigenous cultures now. It´s a pressure cooker that you can´t cover up anymore. Latin America is waking up: all those social movements that were put down over the years are now in the position to advance.

Recently, I spoke with Greg Wilpert, editor of venezuelanalysis.com and a freelance journalist. Wilpert is the author of Changing Venezuela By Taking Power, forthcoming from Verso Books later this year. During the one hour interview the two discussed Venezuelan media, the role of the internet, U.S.-Venezuelan relations, socialist education, and obstacles for the Bolivarian process as it moves ahead.

NK: What is your personal background?

GW: I was born in the U.S. but moved to Germany because my father was German and my mother is American. When I finished high school I went to study in the U.S. I went to college in San Diego and did my PhD in sociology at Brandeis University in Massachusetts.

NK: How did you come to be in Venezuela?

GW: I spent six years living in New York and that´s where I met my wife who is Venezuelan. I taught sociology at the New School. My wife had to go back to Venezuela as she finished her studies and was on a temporary visa. I´ve been here ever since, seven years now. I came down on a Fulbright to do research and teach at the Central University of Venezuela. The grant ran out, but right about the time of the coup attempt I decided to focus more on journalism. I felt the international media wasn´t doing as good a job as it should. In 2003 I hooked up with one of the founders of Aporrea.

ORIGINS OF VENEZUELANALYSIS

NK: What is Aporrea?

GW: It´s one of the main Chavista Web sites which was very important following the coup attempt because it provided a key source of information and continuous updates as to what was happening in Venezuela. It was very important for community movements here in Venezuela and also internationally, for people to get a steady stream of information that wasn´t controlled by the existing corporate media. So, we got together and talked about launching something similar but slightly different and geared towards an international audience in English.

NK: When you say ¨we,¨ who do you mean?

GW: Myself and Martin Sanchez, who was one of the founders of aporrea.

NK: So, where does the funding come from?

GW: Well, that´s always a tricky issue (laughs) because of course opposition supporters always say, ¨that´s 100% government.¨ We did receive some funding from the Ministry of Culture, but we also get some grassroots donations. Also, we have mutual support agreements with several different groups, such as Green Left Weekly, Alia2, and briefly with Telesur, among others. We don´t have much money now, at the high point we may have had 4 or 5 people but it keeps fluctuating as people come and go. It´s kind of hard to find people to work on the site because it´s in English but you need people who know the situation in Venezuela.

NK: Do you plan on getting funding from other sources?

GW: Yes, we´re working on getting some advertising, and we´re looking into applying for funding from foundations.

JOURNALISTIC ENVIRONMENT

NK: Does the government ever call you up and complain that it´s unhappy about whatever story, is there any interference?

GW: None whatsoever. As far as the Web site, I´m not in touch with anyone as far as content.

NK: What´s it like working in Caracas and what is the journalistic environment here?

GW: It varies (laughs). I actually have quite a few contacts because my wife works in the government and she was a political activist before Chavez came into office. So, that has certainly helped me. But even for me it´s often quite difficult, because no matter where you come from, and even if you come recommended from someone else, you´re generally regarded with a lot of suspicion from the government and it can be quite difficult to get information.

NK: Have you noticed any growth in anti-American sentiment over the past few years?

GW: No, not at all. Whenever the media talks about Chavez being anti-American, no one here perceives it that way. They perceive him as being anti-Bush.

IMPACT OF THE MEDIA

NK: What kind of impact has venezuelanalysis had, how many people log on to the site?

GW: I think about 1,000 people read the site every day. I have the impression that it does have an important impact; we´ve reached other journalists and academics for example. Journalists who view the site will in turn speak to other journalists who are based here and most of them are anti-government.

NK: And these 1,000 hits, do you know where they come from?

GW: I´m not sure, but I think they´re almost all from the U.S. and Britain.

NK: How effective do you think internet and other pro-Chavez media have been in countering mainstream media coverage?

GW: If you do an international comparison of media coverage on Venezuela, in the English speaking world one generally has the impression that Chavez gets trashed. However, the coverage is actually better in the English speaking media than it is in the German or French media, which I keep an eye on, let alone Brazil or other Latin American media outlets. I can´t say venezuelanalysis has moderated the harsh coverage of Chavez in the English language media, but I do think we´ve had an impact. Actually, there is no other equivalent of our site in other languages.

GROWING RADICALIZATION

NK: To what extent are grassroots groups pressuring the government to radicalize, and what is the impact for the United States?

GW: The problem here in Venezuela is that civil society is relatively weak. There are very few strong or powerful organizations around. The strongest are perhaps the unions, and even they are very small, weak and disorganized. Other than that there´s very little. On the other hand there are demands coming from community groups around the country that are clamoring for attention and they are trying to get Chavez´s attention. And I think they do have some impact in that sense. However, the groups are totally unfocused and disorganized.

NK: What kinds of groups are we talking about?

NK: Mostly community groups that change their formation in various ways. They might have been organized as Bolivarian Circles at one point and as the electoral battle units, now in the consejos comunales and urban land committees, water committees, health committees, whatever. These groups are organized in a thousand different ways. And that´s part of the problem because it´s not coherent. You have Chavez´s party, but that´s seen as a very top down organization. So, there´s all these community groups but no umbrella organization which might channel their demands. So, I do think these groups are pushing the process forward, but in a fairly ineffective manner.

U.S.-VENEZUELAN RELATIONS

NK: There´s been some nationalizations recently, some of these have affected U.S. economic interests. Do you think there may be further nationalizations that might upset U.S.-Venezuelan relations? Are grassroots groups pressuring the government on that front?

GW: No, I don´t think nationalizations is a popular issue. But, I do think the government will continue them, for various reasons. The government has already announced three areas that would be nationalized, and it has proceeded to go ahead. So, it´s not really clear what´s left to do. That is, telecommunications, oil, and electricity. There´s not too much left of strategic importance. But I could imagine nationalization proceeding in various other sectors, which are smaller and less important. Nationalization is part of an overall socialist strategy, and if there was an effort to turn these companies over to worker management or co-management, then nationalization would be a prerequisite for that. I do see that happening down the line.

NK: What about the countryside, are there any U.S. interests in agriculture? Could land reform jeopardize U.S.-Venezuelan relations in any significant way?

GW: One thing you have to consider is that the proportion of agriculture in the gross national product is only about 6%, so it´s really a miniscule portion of the economy. The amount of U.S. interest in that 6% is probably not more than 1% at the most. I don´t think land reform will have any impact on U.S. relations. The most prominent case was this Lord Vestey ranch which belongs to the British, but that case was more or less settled. The government really wants to expand agricultural production and it would be very careful not to disrupt this production. The agreement then with Vestey has to be seen in that context.

NK: There are various U.S. oil companies operating in the Orinoco Oil Belt. Do you see any point of contention there which could damage relations?

GW: If the government proposes that the compensation for the Orinoco Oil Belt production is somehow below market value, then yes relations could be affected. According to Venezuelan law, it has to be at market value and so far it seems the government is interested in doing that. The problem in the Oil Belt, and the reason the government might not give such a good deal, is that we´re talking about much larger sums of money. The foreign oil companies are saying that they invested something like $17 billion in production. I think foreign participation there is about 60-70%, so to get a majority or 60% share the government would have to buy out about half of that. Still, that´s about $8 billion, hardly petty cash. I think the Orinoco Oil Belt is going to be a drawn out process and it´s going to be difficult for the government to come up with the money.

NK: Do you think if Venezuela purchases more foreign arms this might contribute to the inflammatory rhetoric and provide another point of friction?

GW: Yes, that is probably going to happen but actually to a lesser extent in future because I think the government has completed the first wave of updating its military arsenal. Up until now, the military hadn´t received new weapons for almost 20 years. I don´t expect much higher expenditures in the near future.

NK: It sounds from what you´re saying that ironically, despite all the rhetoric, there aren´t a lot of contentious issues in dispute?

GW: I think the situation in Colombia could be a possible contentious point. If Uribe were forced to resign, and his successor was less friendly towards Chavez, the U.S. could exploit the friction.

NK: Well, there is the possibility that we´ll have more ideological radicalization which, while it might not affect U.S. interests directly, could have an important psychological effect, through the formation of cooperatives for example. How do you see the revolutionary process deepening?

GW: I think the danger is that any effort to move away from so-called liberal, representative democracy will be interpreted as an effort to bring about dictatorship. I don´t think that´s a fair conclusion to draw, but I think the U.S. would say this as well as many people in the international community and within the international media. That could isolate Venezuela. And, I think the Chavez government is intent on moving away from capitalism and liberal representative democracy.

NK: How do you see that specifically?

GW: In the measures that he´s already announced. On the political level, for example, giving more power to communal councils, and giving priority to them over representative government or elected officials, also in terms of allocating budgets and making various decisions in the regions of the country. On the economic level, more nationalizations, more worker self-management at all levels. And so, these changes at the political and economic levels will be interpreted as anti-democratic, even if they´re not.

NK: But, with the opposition fractured and Bush distracted in Iraq, do you think that even if things were to radicalize that Washington would be in a position to do anything?

GW: If it´s a situation where the international community could be won over, Bush could do something. At this point however it´s pretty much hopeless for Bush to get other Latin American countries on board, I think that´s a lost cause. But perhaps Bush might try and succeed to get European countries on board.

NK: In the event that a Democrat is elected in 2008, how might this affect relations?

GW: I think it depends on what kind of Democrat. If it´s a moderate Democrat like Hillary Clinton, I could easily see a continuation in friction. Democrats like her and John Kerry have shown a great degree of eagerness to play to the Miami Cuba crowd. Whereas, if it were a more liberal democrat like Obama or Edwards then that could definitely be a big change.

UNIVERSITY OF THE SOUTH?

NK: Given your academic background, it occurred to me to ask: Chavez has talked about launching a so-called "University of the South." If it did take off (and he has launched a Bolivarian University already), to what extent is that an ideological challenge to the U.S.? Have you seen their curriculum and has the Bolivarian University had a radicalizing impact on adult students?

GW: I´ve spent some time looking at the Bolivarian University, and I definitely think it represents an ideological challenge in many ways. The university is a conscious effort to train people for government service, who have a more Bolivarian outlook on the world. I think the University of the South is still a ways off, the last time I heard about it, which was a year ago, it was completely embryonic.

NK: What is the specific curriculum at the Bolivarian University?

GW: It´s very interesting. Students start out even in the first year getting involved in the community and working on community projects, at the same time that they´re in class. So, it´s very centered on helping the poor and developing means to overcome poverty.

NK: The other day I was walking around and I saw a sign reading "Center of Socialist Learning." Is this a move towards propagandistic teaching?

GW: I haven´t seen the center, but all of the new educational programs have some kind of socialist bent to them, for example the Vuelvan Caras program. And yes, it is definitely an attempt to convince a larger segment of the population to support the program. I personally think it´s a bad idea, not because I´m against that type of education but from what I can see there´s an over emphasis on this kind of moral dimension and being moralistic. To my mind that´s not what socialism is about. It´s an elaborate critique which I won´t go into now, but there´s a simplified idea about education that I feel is being propagated sometimes, that we just need to teach people how to think in more collective terms and the collective good instead of the individual good, more in terms of solidarity and everything will follow from there. I just don´t think that´s how education works and it could easily lead to a new form of dogmatism which is quite dangerous.

DEEPENING OF THE REVOLUTION

NK: Well, speaking of which, what do you see as the main obstacles towards a deepening of the Bolivarian process?

GW: The main obstacles I see are actually internal and not external. By and large, I think the external obstacles have been overcome. I think the dynamics of both domestic and international capital have been overcome. Domestic capital, mainly because it´s so weak, it´s completely dependent on the state sector and there´s not much it can do at this point. The old opposition, the old elite is another obstacle and that too has been overcome through all the electoral defeats and coup attempts. So, we are left with three main internal obstacles. One of these is a kind of in-group mentality related to clientelism. Because of the external threats, even though these threats have subsided, there´s still this idea that we need to protect ourselves and promote only those who are with us. That usually leads to a skewed notion of citizenship, where government services and jobs are given mainly to supporters, which has been widely discussed in the media. I think this is a problem which exists and could even get worse. This is a mild form of corruption but it could lead to more serious corruption.

NK: What is the logical conclusion from what you´re saying, could there be social unrest or even revolt?

GW: There´s a contradiction here in the ideology, which is supposed to be universalist, which is supposed to be inclusive of marginalized people, but in actual practice you see the exclusion of some people, of opposition supporters. So, it´s a contradiction that sort of hollows out the belief system, it makes people more cynical. The other thing is that it hardens the opposition. Even if the opposition is a minority, they become more and more willing to actively resist the government if they are completely cut out and cut off from any kind of participation in the social and political life in the country. That could lead to a situation like what we had in Nicaragua, where you had people taking up arms in a low intensity civil war. You could get this in Venezuela, or a terrorist campaign. I still think that´s a possibility if enough people in the opposition were convinced that this was the only way to be politically active. The other danger is this whole focus on Chavez the person. The whole Bolivarian movement is so dependent on Chavez that it causes problems on many different levels. It de-emphasizes what this movement stands for, and it ends up standing for Chavez as president and not much else. And it sets up a situation where you don´t have a real social movement that can channel the political debate, that can articulate societal interests. The whole movement becomes so dependent on this "dialogue," so to speak, which tends to be rather one way, between Chavez and the masses. And of course, the whole thing is rather unstable, because if Chavez were to disappear the whole movement would fall into a thousand pieces.

NK: Chavez has been claiming recently that he´s been targeted for assassination…

GW: I think assassination is a real possibility because people in the opposition who don´t like the government, if they´re smart, they realize that everything is so dependent on Chavez that if they get rid of him they have a very good chance of coming back to power. But, they might also conclude that such a development could provoke total chaos in the country. I think analysts in the U.S. government know that, and maybe I´m being too optimistic or thinking too highly of them, but I kind of doubt they would be interested in total social unrest in Venezuela because that would threaten the oil supply. So that´s why I doubt the U.S. government is behind an attempt to assassinate Chavez. But that doesn´t prevent people in the opposition from wanting it, especially since they probably don´t care very much whether oil goes to the U.S. or not, and their main concern is getting back into power. The third obstacle is Chavez´s governing style. Even though he wants to bring about participatory democracy, he still has a very top down management system and that creates contradictions. He´s not very participatory in his own environment, I have this feeling that he has a very militarist mentality of giving orders and expecting everyone to follow them. This works for a leader in that it´s good to be strong, but it´s lacking a certain amount of flexibility and willingness to accept criticism and input from various sectors. Also, the whole idea of the Enabling Law, of democratizing the country through a relatively undemocratic process, is also contradictory.

Greg Wilpert is editor of venezuelanalysis.com and a freelance journalist. He is the author of Changing Venezuela By Taking Power, forthcoming from Verso Books later this year.

To view the article, click here.

Recently, I sat down with Gonzalo Sebastián Paz, a lecturer in international affairs at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. Sebastian Paz is an expert on South America's ties to Asia. He has previously taught graduate courses on the Southern Cone and Latin America at Argentina's La Plata National University and the University of Salvador. At those institutions, he also taught courses on international economics and politics with a heavy emphasis on Asia. He is one of the few Argentines to have lived and worked in South Korea, and was the recipient of a Korea Foundation Fellowship.

NK: Recently we've seen the rise of left leaning regimes throughout South America, many of which have espoused an anti-U.S. discourse. Simultaneously, many South American countries are cultivating greater economic ties to China. What are China's fundamental economic objectives in South America?

SP: I think China's most important focus is economic. In order to keep growing at high rates, 9 or 10% over the past twenty years, China needs a healthy supply of raw resources. I'm not saying there is nothing political, but this is a secondary consideration. The most important goal is to have access to iron, oil, copper, and gas.

NK: What kinds of infrastructure projects has China funded, and what is behind the policy?

SP: Usually China is willing to help with infrastructure projects that are related to sources of raw materials. That is: ports or other facilities or railroads connecting to mines, allowing shipment of the raw materials to China.

China's Growing Energy Profile

NK: What about energy projects: how significant is the Chinese presence here?

SP: The Chinese presence is still not very significant. But, energy is one of China's top priorities and it expects to invest in this area in future. Fundamentally, China does not trust international financial markets, which are dominated by American companies. The biggest oil companies in China are owned by the state. China wants ownership over the sources of energy all over the world, and they want easy access to this energy. So, China has a very different strategy: it seeks the actual ownership of mines and oil fields.

NK: To what extent will China become a player in the Bolivian energy sector?

SP: I think it's an option on the table. I am sure the Bolivians would prefer to have the Venezuelans engaged, or to a lesser extent the Brazilians or Argentines. But, you need to remember that President Evo Morales visited China before taking office. Even before conducting a state visit to Buenos Aires, he traveled to Beijing.

China Not Willing to "Cross the Line"

NK: What about transportation networks, how are they being refashioned to redirect trade towards Asia?

SP: This is a very old idea. The first country to think up this idea was Japan, in the 1950s and 60s. Japan developed a very important relationship with Brazil and Peru, countries that received a lot of Japanese emigration. In the 1960s and 70s the Japanese sought access to raw materials and infrastructure projects were designed around this central objective.

Currently, China is pursuing a very similar strategy but there is a difference between the Japanese and the Chinese. The Japanese were very concerned about the United States. The Chinese are more flexible in this regard, but they will never cross the line. They are operating in the backyard of the United States; they know this and will never risk endangering the relationship. But, they are willing to take more risks than the Japanese.

China is very interested in the expansion of the Panama Canal; the Chinese have said that they would be interested in the creation of an Inter-Oceanic canal in Nicaragua, and in Argentina they are investing heavily in a railway project. The bottom line is that China is not basing its policy around the needs of countries, but wants to extract raw resources for its own benefit.

NK: How large is the Japanese economic presence in South America in comparison to China?

SP: The Japanese presence is older than the Chinese. But recently Japan has been pursuing a new industrialization strategy, relocating many declining industries to other parts of Asia. Fundamentally, Latin America has not been a priority for Japan over the past 25 years. So, China is the new presence in Latin America and its investment in the region is lesser than the United States, Europe or even Japan. However Chinese investment is growing fast.

NK: To what extent has China eclipsed the U.S. in terms of trade, financial investment, and financial assistance?

SP: Fundamentally, China is not buying products from Latin America in order to achieve political influence, or to use this as leverage to pressure countries, or to try to split Latin America off from the United States. The Chinese are buying soy because they need to feed the people. So, the Chinese policy is economically driven though it may have political consequences.

In 2004, the Argentine government asked China for some economic support so as to pay off its debt to the International Monetary Fund. The Chinese refused. I think this is a very important case that proves my point that China doesn't want to make waves in the Americans' back yard. They know they cannot cross certain lines. They do not want to subvert the institutions that are regulating U.S. hegemony in Latin America. But, they are willing to push farther than the Japanese did in the past.

NK: If you could look into your crystal ball, ten years from now how would you foresee the ongoing relationship between China and Latin America?

SP: China is currently growing because it is connected to the U.S. and Europe. To some extent therefore, the relationship between China and Latin America is conditional on relations between China, the United States, and Europe. So, I don't want to be too linear here, but there is an assumption that China will continue to grow as it will have access to American and European markets. If this happens, China would continue to import raw materials from Latin America. But this is merely an assumption and nothing more. If something should happen to the United States-China relationship, we might have an entirely different situation.

China's Military Gambit

NK: What about defense projects? How significant is the Chinese contribution?

SP: Most Latin American countries supported the Rome Treaty for the International Criminal Court. The United States completely rejected this new organization. The U.S. has asked many countries to grant concessions on this treaty [note: when Latin American countries signed on to the treaty, the United States cut military training to some nations as punishment].

This created an opportunity for China to assert itself. China has provided weapons sales to Latin America. There have been hundreds of Chinese military visits to Latin America, and vice-versa. These exchanges have been very important. Meanwhile, Venezuela, Uruguay and Argentina have refused to send any more military personnel to the so-called School of the Americas [a U.S. training facility located in Fort Benning, Georgia, which was recently renamed WHISC or Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation].

The Chinese have also sent some police officers to Haiti. This is the first ever Chinese military presence in the Western Hemisphere. In that Caribbean country, we have a United Nations peace keeping operation. The United States hasn't been too concerned about this, because the Haiti operation is essentially being run by Mercosur [a South American trade bloc] countries. So, even as the U.S. is getting bogged down in the Middle East, Mercosur is helping the United States by securing Haiti.

Meanwhile, the Chinese have expressed interest in Bejucal and Lourdes, which are former Soviet bases in Cuba. Chinese President Hu Jin Tao visited one of them. There are some reports that China plans to set up a listening station in Cuba so as to spy on U.S. communications. However, I personally am not sure if this is true as the source of the information is the Cuban exiles, who are interested in promoting this view for their own political ends.

NK: To what extent is the growing China role a concern at the State and Defense Departments here in Washington, as well as the White House?

SP: There have been several hearings in Congress, in which representatives of the Defense Department have spoken. The U.S. Southern Command in Miami has been very concerned about this growing Chinese presence. Within the Republican Party, there has also been rising concern about the issue. In testimony, officers at the U.S. Southern Command have remarked that conducting military sanctions against Latin American countries that supported the Treaty of Rome has proven to be a counterproductive strategy. The U.S. policy has allowed China an opportunity to expand its military aid and diplomacy. Because of South Com's testimony, three months ago the U.S. government decided to abandon its sanction policy against many Latin American countries.

China, Latin America, and Human Rights

NK: Do you find it ironic that, even as South American governments proclaim their adherence to social and economic justice, they seek to pursue an alliance with China which has a horrible human rights record?

SP: This is a complex issue. As you probably know, the first country to pursue an Asian strategy was Chile. Under Pinochet, Chile was criticized for its human rights record and the government sought to break out of its diplomatic isolation by pursuing ties to Asian countries that never made a big issue out of human rights.

Pinochet sought diplomatic relations with South Korea, Taiwan, China, and the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos. Similarly, immediately following the Tiananmen Square massacre, the Chinese sought to break out of their diplomatic encirclement by approaching Latin America. In fact, the first trip by Chinese dignitaries after the massacre was to Latin America.

But most countries, not to say all countries of the world, are far from consistent on human rights and China and they make many exceptions. Within the European Union, even France and Germany have recently debated selling weapons to China.

South American Views of China

NK: If China does become a major political and economic player in South America, what do you think the response from civil society and social movements will be?

SP: One needs to look at this on a country by country basis. In some countries China is viewed as a friend whereas in others it is viewed as a threat, economically speaking. Mexico fears China, and the Mexican government has the numbers to prove it. The Mexicans have lost thousands of jobs because of Chinese exports. In the Southern Cone however, China is perceived as a partner. You cannot understand the miraculous Argentine recovery after the financial crisis of December 2001 without considering the boom in soy exports to China.

Industrial workers in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are quite worried about this new relationship with China because they fear they may lose their jobs. Other sectors may be happy because they see China as an alternative to U.S. imperialism and hegemony. I think right now there is little ideological clarity amongst social movements in South America. There is a big soup of indigenous movements, ecological groups, socialist/former Marxist movements, and not all of them have a consistent set of values.

NK: Has China sought to portray itself differently from the U.S. so as to dispel Latin Americans' concerns about imperialism and outside interference?

SP: China used to be the champion of Third World-ism. Now it's trying to become the champion of a multi polar world, which is something different. I don't think that China is perceived as a force which can challenge the United States. I think many people in Latin America overestimate China's capacity to change the rules of the game at an international level. China has actually been playing by the rules in many respects.

Nevertheless, U.S. policies have created an opening for China in Latin America. I'm not saying that China respects international law, but in the past few years there's been a lot of anger with the U.S. over the war in Iraq. As you remember, Mexico and Chile were members of the Security Council and they refused to authorize the use of force.

This was a very difficult decision, because these two countries were the closest friends of the U.S. in Latin America. Of course there have been some exceptions; the Salvadorans sent some forces to Iraq. But by and large, public opinion in Latin America was opposed to the U.S., which did not respect international law.

NK: What about the Amazon region, which has witnessed a lot of social unrest against development projects? What are Asian countries' plans for the area and do you think there could be social unrest in the area against China or others if development plans continue to mimic what we have seen in the past?

SP: Clearing the forest in the Amazon and exporting soy is an effort to link up to China, and there may be mining projects as well. We need to see to what extent the various governments within the Amazon region are able to control social groups. At this point I don't think any social movements in Venezuela would seriously be able to contest Chavez's power. This may not be the case in other countries such as Bolivia under Evo Morales, where the authorities are not nearly as well established.

From Tango to Tae Kwan Do

NK: In Peru during the 1990s, Alberto Fujimori, who was of Japanese descent, used his racial ancestry to propel himself to the presidency. In that case, Fujimori was able to play off people's perception that Asians were hard working. How deeply rooted is this idea?

SP: Cultural images of Asia in Latin America have been promoted through movies and books from the United States and Europe. But now, through direct experience and direct contact, Asians and Latin Americans are beginning to forge new ideas about one another which are unmediated by external cultural artifacts. This development is really something novel, and it hasn't occurred for decades or even centuries.

The first humans that lived in Latin America came from Asia, so if you want to trace the relationship you can go back pretty far. The second important event was the Manila Galleon. This was the backbone to trade in the Pacific for 250 years, and it was really very important. The third component was Asian immigration to Latin America in the 19th and 20th centuries. Economic growth and the so-called "Asian miracle" shaped Latin Americans' perceptions further and led to envy.

The image of the "Other" is different depending on the country. In Buenos Aires, if you think about Asia your reference point is the Japanese, who have dry cleaning businesses or work in the flower industry. In Peru, the reference point is the chifa [Chinese restaurant].

Cultural awareness of Asia has grown with the rise of Asian food, which is now available throughout Latin America. Martial arts are also popular, including Tae Kwon Do, Karate, and Tai Chi. I was one of the first Latin American experts to live in Asia. I remember there was an excellent professor of Tae Kwon Do from Korea who went to Buenos Aires to teach. Five years later he returned to Seoul and became a tango professor. This was amazing.

Meeting up at Macondo

SP: For Asian leaders, Latin America was a remote area, unstable, and incapable of fostering economic development. However, this view took a big blow with the economic crisis in 1997. The crisis started in Thailand and then spread throughout the region, and as a result Asians were humbled.

APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) is the most important and symbolic meeting within the Asia Pacific region. A couple of times APEC meetings have been held in Latin America, which is something pretty new and impossible to imagine say, twenty or thirty years ago.

The 2004 APEC meeting in Chile, in particular, was really important in putting Latin America on the map of the Pacific Rim. It was really very interesting to see Asian leaders asking the Mexicans and Chileans how to deal with the IMF following the 1997 meltdown. So, this changed the idea of the "Other" for Asian elites. Still, very few people in Asia know anything about Latin America.

NK: You spent some time living and working in Asia, what was your experience?

SP: I remember when I was living in Seoul in 1996 there were very few Latin Americans. Most people worked in the various embassies. We used to meet in a small café called Macondo. They used to play salsa music in Macondo, which at that time was totally unknown in South Korea and people didn't know how to dance to it. When I returned in 1999 there were thousands, if not millions of young people dancing salsa much better than me—we Argentines are usually not very good salsa dancers.

Chile and the "Platform" to Asia

NK: Currently there are a lot of different proposals concerning hemispheric integration in South America. There is Mercosur, which Venezuela recently joined. However, Venezuelan President Chavez has even been critical of Mercosur, and has called on countries to further more progressive trading arrangements such as the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (known by its Spanish acronym ALBA). Bolivia under Morales seems to favor Chavez's views on ALBA.

Chile, on the other hand, has an entirely different view about integration. The country hopes to act as a "platform" to Asia and a means by which South America could gain access to the Asian market.

Which of these visions do you think will predominate?

SP: In the past, Latin America was not considered to be part of the Pacific Rim, and did not share in the institutions, markets, or organizations. Chile and Mexico were one of the first Latin American countries to gain access to markets and institutions within the area. At first, Chile saw the Pacific Rim as its own area, and did not see itself as a platform for other South American countries. Chileans were not really willing to allow Argentine wheat or corn to be exported through Chilean ports. They weren't interested in this; they wanted the markets for themselves.

But other economic sectors, who did not share the interests of the agricultural sector in the central valley of Chile, began to imagine a different role for their country: as a gateway for Asians to do business in Latin America, and for Latin America to do business in Asia. But this was not initially the attitude during the time of Pinochet and slightly after. So, Chile has changed its attitude in terms of its role as a bridge between the two regions.

Another development was that Asia realized that Chile was a very small market, and a nation of only 15 million people. Asia was interested in the big countries in South America, Brazil and Argentina for example, which did not have any coastline on the Pacific. At the end of the day, China managed to set up direct links with Brazil and Argentina and because of this all the institutional architecture that had been built up within the Pacific Rim during the 1980s and 90s became less relevant.

On the other hand, the end of the Cold War made it possible for a greater convergence of political values, and later the Washington Consensus was pushed as a remedy for much of the region's ills. Unfortunately, by the end of the 1990s this recipe was perceived as a failure in Latin America and this created a crisis. This resulted in the emergence of left wing populist leaders such as Chavez, Morales, and others.

But, the Chileans have created a model that has been successful to an extent. The first free trade agreement ever signed between a Latin American and an Asian country was Chile and South Korea. So, the Chileans are pursuing a strategy which has nothing to do with Chavez's ideas.

Meanwhile the Mexican economy is totally integrated into the U.S., to the extent that some people joke that Mexico no longer belongs to Latin America. Brazil and Argentina have tried to carve out an economically and politically autonomous region of their own in the Southern Cone.

This idea of autonomy has become more complicated now from a political standpoint with the inclusion of Venezuela within Mercosur. There is an expectation that Venezuela could help to supply the energy needs of Mercosur, but we will have to see how this works out.

Gonzalo Sebastián Paz is a lecturer in international affairs at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., and is an expert on South America's ties to Asia. He has previously taught graduate courses on the Southern Cone and Latin America at Argentina's La Plata National University and the University of Salvador.

For Hugo Chavez, large, industrial mega projects could turn into a political mine field. The contradiction between Chavez’s rhetoric stressing social equality, on the one hand, and environmental abuses on the other, was driven home to me over this past summer when I attended the first ever environmental conference of Lake Maracaibo. The event was held in the city of Maracaibo itself, the capital of Zulia state, and organized by the government’s Institute for the Conservation of Lake Maracaibo (known by the Spanish acronym ICLAM).

Somewhat oddly, outside of the dining hall where conference participants ate lunch mining companies had set up promotional booths. Walking through an adjacent hallway, scantily clad women working for mining and oil companies plied me with glossy pamphlets and even candy. Later during the conference itself, one panelist, a representative from the local development agency Corpozulia, gave a rosy presentation about new port and infrastructure projects planned for the state of Zulia.

Later, I went back to the luxurious Hotel Kristoff where the government had put me up for the duration of my stay. One morning, sitting at a table overlooking the hotel pool, I was joined by Jorge Hinestroza, a sociologist at the University of Zulia and former General Coordinator of the Federation of Zulia Ecologists.

Sierra of Perija: Area of Conflict

Hinestroza spoke to me of destructive coal mining in the Sierra of Perija, a mountain range which marks a section of the border between Venezuela and Colombia. The area, which is home to large coal deposits, has suffered severe deforestation.

Industrial coal production, Hinestroza explained, had damaged Indian lands. He complained that America Port, a new project proposed by Corpozulia, would prove "catastrophic for mangrove vegetation in the area." The project, he continued, was linked to coal exploitation. What’s more, Corpozulia itself owned the mining concessions.

According to reports, the Añú community, comprised of 3,000 people living around the Lake Sinamaica region in Zulia, is concerned about the devastation that would result from the construction of a deep-water port in the area, for exporting coal.

If Chavez does not attend to rising calls for greater environmental controls, he will lose support amongst one of his most loyal constituencies, the indigenous population. Already, industrial mega projects have led to angry protest and undermined public confidence in the regime. For Chavez, it is surely one of the thorniest problems that his government must confront.

Launching Raids into Indian Country

Though Indians inhabiting the Sierra of Perija have had to confront extensive coal mining in the Chavez era, it’s not as if indigenous peoples living in the area are strangers to conflict. In the first half of the twentieth century, Motilon Indians [also known as the Bari], which included several indigenous groups inhabiting the area of Perijá, confronted British and American oil prospectors.

In 2001, I was living in Maracaibo doing research for my dissertation dealing with the environmental history of oil development in Lake Maracaibo. Working in the historical archive, I was struck by historical accounts of oil prospectors headed to Indian country.

In 1914, for example, one oil expedition marched into the jungle accompanied by a large company of 50 peons. In seeking to penetrate Motilon Indian country, oil prospectors were aided by the Venezuelan government. As one oil pioneer put it, "we had for arms 12 Mauser military rifles from the government. Every man had either a revolver or a rifle."

Oil prospectors on one expedition discovered a Motilon house, but were forced to make a harrowing escape in canoes along river rapids when Indians appeared. The oil men shot back, hitting at least twelve men.

One oilman commented: "I do not like the idea of destroying a whole community of men, women and children. But this would be the only thing to do unless peace is made … If oil is found up the Lora [River], peaceful relations with the Indians would be worth several hundred thousand dollars to the company."

"It Would Be Convenient to Suppress Them with Gas or Grenades"

Eventually, oil infrastructure in Indian country proceeded. Indians had to contend not only with armed prospectors but also growing contamination from open earth oil sumps and dwindling hunting grounds.

For the growing American community in Maracaibo, the Motilones were a nuisance. One English language paper, the Tropical Sun, remarked, "It would be convenient to suppress the Motilon Indians by attacking them with asphyxiating gas or explosive grenades."

There are no documented cases of large scale artillery attacks on the Motilon Indians. However, Father Cesareo de Armellada, a Capuchin priest who later played a pivotal role in contacting groups of Motilones, claimed that

"It was said by some sotto voce and others even admitted publicly that in the Colombian region [of Perija] thenational army organized raids under the slogan of: there is no other way. And it is also saidthat in the same region the Motilones were bombed by airplanes. The same thing has been repeated to me by many people living within the Venezuelan region of Perija and Colon."

De Armellada continued that "Secret punitive expeditions" were organized against the Motilones.

Oil Companies: Bombing the Indians

Some reports suggest a fair degree of cooperation between the government and oil companies in organizing armed expeditions. Not surprisingly, the government’s policy of allowing oil companies to enter Motilon territory led to greater violence. The U.S. Consul in Maracaibo, Alexander Sloan, noted that a state of open warfare existed in Motilon territory:

"During the last year the Indian attacks have increased in frequency and bitterness. On several occasions lately boat crews have abandoned their tows, because they were attacked so fiercely and so persistently by the Motilones [sic] that they considered it necessary to get away as speedily as possible."

Even more alarming, "attacks on trains have been made only within recent months, and in these attacks the Indians have shown a persistence that they never exhibited before."

According to de Armellada, in the 1930s and early 40s the oil companies were able to encircle the Motilones in a tighter ring stretching over several hundred square kilometers. However, this had resulted in many deaths.

There is some evidence that the oil companies even resorted to aerial bombardment. One British diplomat noted that the Motilones hated strangers, and were "embittered" as a result of an attempt by an American company to bomb their settlements.

The diplomat did not specify which company was involved in the attacks, although it would seem at least possible that this was Creole Petroleum Corporation, an American company which sought to open up Motilon territory to oil expansion, and which had planes.

Overflights of Indian Country

De Armellada sought support from the oil companies in the form of over flights of Indian villages. The over flights were accompanied by a propaganda effort launched by de Armellada, who sought to present his ideological justification for the expeditions. De Armellada promoted the Motilon effort through Topicos Shell, a glossy Shell company magazine.

In May 1947, Creole Petroleum Corporation provided de Armellada with a twin engine flying boat. The company was a powerful subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey and was in a position to lend credibility and resources to the Capuchin priest. Creole’s head of public relations, Everett Bauman, recalled later that de Armellada came up with the idea of dropping bundles of gifts as well as his own picture from a plane. By dropping gifts to the Indians, de Armellada hoped, Motilones would later prove receptive to missionary efforts. With his newfound support, de Armellada organized an over flight of Motilon villages in an effort to establish peaceful relations.

Shortly after one of de Armellada’s flights took off, the expedition sighted Motilon dwellings from the air, consisting of rudimentary thatched shelters. Noted Caracas Journal, "The Indians were nowhere to be seen, having rushed to hide in the undergrowth, in alarm at the roar of the plane’s motors."

The plane dropped a number of goods on the village such as cloth, salt, flour, hoes, needles, thread, and mirrors as tokens of good will. The airplane was also careful to drop De Armellada’s photo, "thus ensuring the missionary a gentlewelcome when he arrives accompanied by two other monks, into their [Motilon] territory." Throughout 1947, the Capuchins continued their over flights of Motilon territory, dropping similar "bombs" of gifts and boxes.

Triumph of Missionaries and Big Oil

Fortunately for de Armellada, on the fifth flight in December 1947 Motilones no longer hid in the jungle but stepped outside their huts accompanied by their pet dogs. Encouraged, de Armellada picked up the pace of the overhead flights, which ran weekly for the following three months. "The enthusiasm displayed by the Indians," noted de Armellada, "increased as much as ours."

The Indians lost their fear, and Motilon children began to play with the parachutes which accompanied box gifts. Observing that the Indians had taken to their gifts, the Capuchins dropped pre-made clothes, large dolls, and even two goats. According to de Armellada, the Indians waved donated Venezuelan flags in the air when missionary flights passed overhead.

Meanwhile, De Armellada made a plea in Topicos Shell for more assistance. Anyone who considered themselves a proper Christian had a "sacred duty" to help the effort. With the help of Creole Petroleum Corporation, which drew up a map of Motilon areas based on aerial photographs, de Armellada was able to locate 14 Motilon huts along the Lora River and northwards. Various families lived in each house, with a variable number of individuals oscillating between 20 and 50.

De Armellada’s successes paved the way for future missionary efforts in Motilon country, and by the early 1960s the Capuchins had established various missionary centers within Indian territory. The missionary advance was accompanied by yet more intrusion by oil companies and landowners, and Motilones were displaced towards nearby towns.

Chavez: A New Beginning for Zulia Indians?

In the mid-1990s, Indians in the Sierra of Perija continued to face daunting challenges. For example, Wayuu and Yupka peoples lost their lands to large, state-controlled coal mines and oil drilling.

In 1998, the election of Hugo Chavez to the presidency stood to dramatically change the plight of indigenous people. In contrast to earlier regimes, Chavez took a more anti-missionary stance on indigenous policy. For example, he expelled the New Tribes Mission, an American missionary group working with Venezuelan indigenous communities. Chavez accused New Tribes of collaborating with the CIA.

Chavez’s 1999 Constitution represented a big step forward for Indians. Under article 9, Spanish was declared the official language of Venezuela, but "Indigenous languages are also for official use for indigenous peoples and must be respected throughout the Republic’s territory for being part of the nation’s and humanity’s patrimonial culture." In chapter eight of the constitution, the state recognized the social, political, and economic organization within indigenous communities, in addition to their cultures, languages, rights, and lands.

What is more, in a critical provision the government recognized land rights as collective, inalienable, and non-transferable. Later articles declared the government’s pledge not to engage in extraction of natural resources without prior consultation with indigenous groups.

Chavez himself has distributed millions of acres of land to indigenous communities. The move forms part of the so called Mission Guaicaipuro which shall provide land titles to all of Venezuela’s 28 indigenous peoples.

Indians to Chavez: Land Policy a "Fraud"

Despite the passage of the new constitution, however, Indians from the Sierra of Perija have protested the government which they claim does not pay sufficient attention to their needs.

In 2005, hundreds of Wayuu, Bari and Yukpa Indians traveled to Bolivar Square in Caracas. Bare-chested, wearing traditional dress and wielding bows and arrows, they denounced mining operations in Zulia.

Interestingly, the indigenous protestors were staunch Chávez supporters and most sported red headbands with pro-government slogans, while others wore red berets, symbolic of Chavez’s governing Fifth Republic Movement party.

One protest sign read, "Compañero Chávez, support our cause." Another declared, "Vito barí atañoo yiroo oshishibain (We don’t want coal mining)".

Despite their pro-government leanings, Indians said that efforts to formalize their ancestral lands constituted a "fraud." In a statement they declared, "They will allocate lands to us but later try to evict us to exploit coal."

The leader of the Wayuu delegation, Angela Aurora, said that coal mining in Zulia had deforested thousands of acres of land as well as contaminated rivers. Mining additionally had killed or sickened local residents with respiratory diseases caused by coal dust.

Sierra of Perija and Contradictions of Chavismo

Though Chavez has derided globalization and large financial institutions, the case of the Sierra of Perija reveals a fundamental contradiction within Chavismo. In fitting irony, Douglas Bravo, a former communist guerrilla from the 1960s and 70s, was also present at the indigenous protest in Caracas. Bravo now devotes his time to promoting environmental groups.

"This is a manifestation of an autonomous and independent revival of the popular movement," he said. "At the same time," he added, "it is the beginning of a new stage in the independent environmental movement, against globalization and the multinationals."

In a sense, Bravo is right. The Sierra of Perija is in the crosshairs of important economic development. The government has sought joint ventures between the public coal company Carbozulia and various foreign companies including Vale do Rio Doce of Brazil, the British-South African Anglo American, the Anglo-Dutch Shell, Ruhrkohle from Germany and the U.S. Chevron-Texaco.

On the one hand, Chavez needs political support from indigenous peoples. But he also seeks important hemispheric integration, which could jeopardize this support. The Venezuelan northwest is vital to solidifying ties with Brazil and Mercosur, a South American trade bloc [for more on these inherent contradictions, see my earlier Counterpunch article, "The Rise of Rafael Correa: Ecuador and the Contradictions of Chavismo," November 27, 2006].

"If We Have to Die For Our Lands, We Will Die"

Some government officials have big plans for Zulia. In 2004, Carbozulia and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce of Brazil created a new consortium, Carbosuramérica, to undertake additional mining operations in the region. Activists fear that Zulia is fast becoming an exit platform to the Caribbean Sea, and that the area is serving the interests of transnational companies. While the companies seek to get their products out, the environment is being sacrificed.

Mining and ports projects within Zulia in turn form part of the IIRSA, Initiative for South American Regional Infrastructure Integration (promoted by Brazil and the new South American Community of Nations).

Chavez, who is trying to construct an alliance of left leaning regimes in South America, knows that he must secure vital diplomatic support from President Lula of Brazil. But if the Venezuelan government presses ahead with its development agenda in the Sierra of Perija, the regime will have to reckon with severe domestic opposition.

During the indigenous protest in Caracas, Cesáreo Panapaera, a Yukpa leader, declared, "We want the government to hear us: we don’t want coal. Here are our bows and arrows, and we will use them against the miners if they come to our lands. And if we have to die fighting for our lands, we will die."