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As Latin America and the wider world seek to come to terms with the death of Hugo Chavez, many may wonder about the Venezuelan populist's political legacy.
In the immediate term, the deceased comandante's shadow will loom large over Venezuela's next snap presidential election which will be held on April 14. Nicolas Maduro, Venezuela's former Foreign Minister, will face off against Henrique Capriles Radonski, who previously challenged Chavez for the presidency and lost.
As I discussed on al-Jazeera English this evening [apparently no link available], the election may hinge on who can best come off as "Chavez-lite." Capriles is unlikely to question Chavez's adherence to social programs which redistributed wealth to the neediest. Indeed, while he served as Governor of the state of Miranda, Capriles actually emulated Chavez by adopting similar populist social programs himself. In this sense, Capriles is probably the most electable candidate to spring from the opposition, which was historically fractured and extremely fanatical. On the other hand, there is a great deal of sympathy for Chavez, and Maduro will benefit from his association with the Bolivarian Revolution. Even though Maduro lacks Chavez's charisma, he can bank on favorable blanket coverage from state-run media and support from Chavez's own PSUV political machine.
As I stated on al-Jazeera, my concern is that there will be very little space for a more radical discussion during this short-lived campaign. Though the candidates may disagree about foreign policy, they essentially agree on the overall contours of domestic social policy. Indeed, the fundamental psychological mindset of the Venezuelan poor has shifted so dramatically under Chavez that it is unlikely that any president, let alone a conservative one, would dare to turn back the clock and reintroduce the kinds of market reforms which characterized political life during the 1990s.
With no substantial disagreements on the social front, the campaign may center upon other issues such as urban crime. But while frightening homicides in Caracas and other cities are certainly important, such concerns pale beside the larger question of the Bolivarian Revolution and radical transformation of political life. What of the economic cooperatives, communal councils, ALBA and alternative currencies? These are all measures which serve to reconfigure fundamental power relations, and though some programs have been linked to cronyism and corruption, they represent an idealistic challenge to the underpinnings of the capitalist state.
A couple of days ago, while speaking on Fareed Zakaria GPS on CNN, I touched on such vital questions during a roundtable panel discussion [apparently the entire segment is unavailable, though you can watch this snippet which unfortunately does not include me]. The other guests included Moises Naim, a Venezuelan writer and columnist who was previously associated with IESA, a conservative business school in Caracas which pushed economic reforms eschewed by Chavez. We were also joined by Rory Carroll of the Guardian newspaper.
With Naim staking out the predictable anti-Chavez right, maybe Zakaria thought I would take up the full role of Chavez partisan. At the beginning of the interview, the CNN host turned to me and asked, "you like Chavez, right?" It's a perfectly reasonable question, though I wasn't entirely sure how to respond. Discussions about Chavez tend to split between ideological partisans on both sides, and there's often very little space for additional views. As readers are aware, I have some mixed feelings about populism, a very polemical subject in Latin America. In the end, I think I answered something to the effect of "it's a mixed bag," though I might have easily added "it's complicated!"
It's difficult to convey a minority within a minority viewpoint sometimes, though hopefully the viewers will have understood that I am critical of Chavez --- not from the right but from the left. I said that Chavez was wrong to have embraced Bashar al-Assad of Syria and Muammar Qaddafi of Libya, which in the long run discredited Venezuela amongst the international left and revolutionaries associated with the Arab Spring.
In an effort to move the conversation into provocative territory, I also argued that Chavez had actually not gone too far but not far enough. Whatever the problems with the cooperatives, I declared, they should be improved upon in an effort to promote worker democracy. Predictably, Naim trashed the cooperatives and went on a rant about how Chavez had wrecked the economy. Rather disappointingly for a leftist Guardian columnist, Carroll kind of chimed in by pointing to flaws in the cooperative system.
I hope that the media will continue to touch upon Chavez's political legacy, and particularly the more radical and anti-capitalist measures which deserve more systematic attention and scrutiny. Perhaps, socialist constituencies within the Bolivarian camp or even anarchists can force likely presidential winner Maduro to deepen the ongoing process of social transformation. It's not an easy task, however, because Maduro --- like Chavez before him --- also answers to rival constituencies such as the managerial capitalist class.
As Latin America and the wider world ponders the post-Chavez landscape, it's hardly clear where the left goes from here. While Chavez radicalized the Venezuelan people through innovative programs, his haphazard government failed to follow through on lasting bottom up revolutionary change. Though populists like Chavez mobilize the people, they typically only go so far and never overturn the social order. If anything, Maduro seems more cautious and diplomatic than Chavez and seems to eschew the inflammatory rhetoric of his mentor.
Perhaps, Rafael Correa of Ecuador may inherit the Chavez mantle. Like his Venezuelan mentor, Correa is a populist who also employs fiery rhetoric to mobilize the masses. He is pretty popular, too, having just won reelection in a landslide. Whether he has the vision or even the desire to transform Ecuador into a radical social laboratory, however, is open to doubt. To be sure, the Ecuadoran has some interesting ideas about climate change and challenging the Global North on global warming, but overall Correa seems pretty intent on pursuing the extractive economy and this hardly bodes well for his relations with social forces on the ground. Over in Bolivia, meanwhile, Evo Morales also made noises about climate change at one time but even he has run afoul of the Indians who dislike the government's boondoggle projects.
From about 2002 to 2006, before he started to pursue more questionable and retrograde policies, Hugo Chavez injected a welcome note of idealism into Latin politics. If it wants to be successful, the next generation of regional leaders should think about taking up some of Chavez's empowering ideas such as economic cooperatives, ALBA barter, alternative currencies and communal councils, while avoiding all of the potential downsides like patronage networks and cronyism. If future leaders can build upon such an agenda, while incorporating concerns over climate change and the extractive economy, they just might succeed in bringing about long-term revolutionary change and not just charismatic populism which can often prove transitory or even ephemeral.
As the unlikely Julian Assange affair continues to play out in London, the imbroglio stands to have unforeseen political ripple effects in countries near and far. In Ecuador, President Rafael Correa is hoping that the WikiLeaks saga will unfold to his advantage in advance of the country's February, 2013 election. By granting political asylum to Assange, Correa calculates that he may appeal to Ecuadoran nationalism and a wounded sense of pride. Though certainly risky in certain respects, Correa's high stakes gamble could pay off as many Ecuadoran poor rally to his banner. Indeed, it's possible that Correa's foes will veer off the Assange issue and conclude that this wild card is best left untouched.
The subject is particularly touchy for Guillermo Lasso, a veteran politician with perhaps the greatest chance of dislodging Correa from power. Though the President is looking rather solid in the polls, Lasso has been steadily gaining in popularity. A powerful political and economic insider who has served in two separate administrations, Lasso is former head of the Guayaquil Central Bank and briefly served as Governor of the coastal state of Guayas.
Despite this long track record, Lasso carries some unflattering baggage which could taint his future political prospects. According to secret diplomatic cables recently released by WikiLeaks, Lasso was determined to unseat Correa and appealed directly to the U.S. Embassy in Quito. In light of the embarrassing revelations, it's doubtful whether Lasso has a lot of sympathy for Assange and his plight.
Lasso's animosity toward the Quito government was put on display early on in the first Correa administration. Writing to her superiors in Washington, U.S. Ambassor to Ecuador Linda Jewell remarked that the "usually fractious" Ecuadoran private sector had gotten its act together and was beginning to develop "what could become a cohesive response to what it perceives as threats from the Correa administration."
Such efforts were being led by paranoid rightist forces from the commercially important city of Guayaquil, which feared creeping political encroachment by Correa, a politician linked to Hugo Chávez of Venezuela. Scared for the future, business figures urged the U.S. "to do their heavy lifting" and organize against the central government.
LASSOing the U.S. against Correa
Key in such efforts was none other than Guayaquil banker Lasso, who brazenly spoke to the Americans about his desire to rid the country of Correa. According to Jewell, Lasso had organized a "systematic effort" to coordinate the Correa opposition through a group called "Ecuador Libre" or "Ecuador Free" [according to Lasso's own web site, Ecuador Libre is a think tank pledged to coming up with public policy solutions based on the ideas of "liberty and social solidarity"].
Lasso reported that the business community had launched its own public relations effort and produced a breathless radio spot "which featured a Venezuelan voice discussing the situation in Venezuela and an Ecuadorian voice responding that she would not want the same situation to develop in Ecuador."
Determined to halt state control over the economy, Lasso had spoken to other prominent Correa opponents such as former president Lucio Gutiérrez and Guayaquil Mayor Jaime Nebot. During his conversation with the U.S. Embassy, Lasso refrained from requesting "extensive support" though the Guayaquil man did ask the Americans to "echo the private sector's appeal for individual freedoms should the private sector come under fire from the government."
Jewell, however, seemed a bit skeptical of getting too "lassoed" into action. The Ambassador noted that there were "real limits to working with these political leaders." Gutiérrez was willing to work with the business community, "but only on his terms," while Nebot had "chosen to frame his role as defending local Guayaquil interests (e.g., the status of the Guayaquil port), rather than seeking the mantle of leader of the national opposition to the Correa agenda."
By simply participating in the discussion, Jewell was certainly complicit in opposition scheming against Correa. Nevertheless, the diplomat was still wary and remarked to her superiors that "we have emphasized the importance of domestic sectors working toward consensus and offering responsible alternatives as a necessary pre-condition before any international engagement can be truly effective."
Business Friendly Governor
If anything, WikiLeaks cables merely underscore what many Ecuadorans have long suspected about Lasso: namely, that the banker is a consummate political and economic insider who favors the interests of Washington and large financial institutions. Lasso's rise on the national stage can be traced back to the year 1999, when impoverished Ecuador faced crushing and spiraling debt. Hoping to avert a catastrophe, President Jamil Mahuad accepted a loan from the International Monetary Fund (or IMF) which obliged Ecuador to reach a balanced budget for the following year.
At the time, Lasso was serving as Governor of Guayas state, having been previously appointed to the position by Mahuad himself. Lasso was also busily at work on radical renovation plans for the city of Guayaquil, the capital city of Guayas. As Director of the Malecón 2000 Foundation, the banker was associated with the previously mentioned Nebot, a politician who was pushing hard for boardwalk renovations.
In a zealous drive to emulate tough guy Mayor Rudy Giuliani, Nebot contracted former New York City Police Commissioner William Bratton to help shape the city's urban regeneration strategy. The newly constructed boardwalk was praised by many local residents as being "just like Miami." However, indigenous street vendors were removed from cleaned up urban spaces. Indeed within the new Guayaquil, urban "undesirables" found working in gentrified areas faced tough penalties and beggars and itinerant vendors could be imprisoned for up to seven days.
Tour Guide at Bush White House
Back in Quito meanwhile, Mahuad was facing economic troubles and so the President tapped Lasso as Ecuador's new Secretary of the Economy. Leaving aside his local political work, Lasso took up his new responsibilities with gusto. However, when Mahuad announced that Ecuador might default on its bonds, the powerful banker abruptly resigned in protest.
Ecuador continued its downward spiral into economic turbulence and political instability in the next couple of years until, finally, Lasso staged a comeback. In late 2002, the newly elected government of Lucio Gutiérrez included the banker on its transition team, a move which went down very well within financial circles. Though Gutiérrez had formerly been a left-leaning army officer and actually helped to depose the Mahuad government amidst a popular insurrection in 2000, the new president quickly made a political U-turn by courting the IMF and appointing Lasso as Ecuador's Ambassador-at-Large to the U.S. In Washington, D.C. Lasso conducted important liaisons with the IMF and Inter-American Development Bank.
In Febuary, 2003 Gutiérrez's betrayal of the Ecuadoran left went into high gear. Flying to Washington, the new Ecuadoran President met with George W. Bush at the White House. Lasso meticulously conducted every detail of Gutiérrez's tour, and the banker "moved like a fish out of water" in his new home. Reportedly, however, Lasso's presence proved disconcerting to Ecuador's career diplomats, who resented the banker's outsized influence.
Hoping to make a good impression on the Bush team, Lasso steered Gutiérrez in his meeting with the U.S. Republican President. Emerging later from the Oval Office, the new Ecuadoran leader announced that he wanted his country to "become the best ally of the U.S." in the fight against terror and drug smuggling. As Gutiérrez veered to the right, Lasso's profile continued to soar, and the banker was put in charge of free trade negotiations with the U.S.
Yet again, however, Lasso was foiled in his effort to ram through his business-friendly agenda. Though progressive social forces originally supported Gutiérrez, they turned against the President once it became clear that he was more interested in pursuing Lasso's corporate-style politics. In 2005, protests forced the President from power and a new caretaker government under Alfredo Palacio took over.
Hoping to appease the left, Palacio appointed the aspiring and ambitious Rafael Correa as Economy Minister. Palacio was critical of many of his predecessors' policies, but the caretaker president was no radical. Indeed, according to WikiLeaks cables, Palacio requested U.S. assistance with international financial institutions and declared that he could be an effective "counterweight" to Hugo Chávez of Venezuela. Perversely, he even asked Washington and the World Bank to provide security on Amazonian oil fields.
Despite these conservative leanings, Lasso was still dissatisfied. According to one WikiLeaks cable, the Guayaquil businessman approached the Americans and griped about Palacio. According to Lasso, Palacio "had lifted his political philosophy from his communist father. Lasso did not think Palacio had drifted far from his father's views."
Candidate's Far Right Connections
Given that even the Palacio regime was far too leftist for Lasso, it is understandable that the Guayaquil banker will now stop at nothing in his effort to unseat the more nationalist/populist Correa, who first came to power in 2006. On the campaign trail, Lasso likes to strike a moderate tone, remarking that he would do a better and more efficient job at social investment than Ecuador's current President. In an effort to counteract Correa's populism, Lasso has even inveighed against his own country's political class and business leaders, who he claims are out of touch with the day-to-day life of most working people.
Lasso's personal connections, however, seem to belie any such democratic talk. The Guayaquil businessman is a great admirer of former Spanish President José María Aznar, a conservative politician whose government was allegedly involved in an attempted coup d'etat against Hugo Chávez. What is more, Lasso is a member of Opus Dei, a Catholic organization which reportedly enjoyed significant influence under the Augusto Pinochet military dictatorship in Chile. In addition, Lasso is a member of Georgetown University's Latin America Board, an entity which "seeks to promote leaders who will make a disproportionate difference in the world." The Board is linked to the school's Walsh School of Foreign Service and Security Studies Program, which is a haven for spooks and intelligence folk.
The 2013 Election
As history has shown time and again, Ecuadoran social movements have little patience with the pro-U.S. and pro-corporate agenda, and all leaders from Mahuad to Gutiérrez to Palacio to even Correa have been acutely aware of this fact. Lasso, a more recent candidate espousing rightist views, must tread carefully lest he incur the wrath of Ecuador's poor majority.
Yet, according to the Guardian, the Guayaquil man is now polling at 17% of the vote and "election observers, including the Correa campaign, view Guillermo Lasso as the candidate most capable of forcing a runoff and, indeed, possibly winning the election." Meanwhile, though the candidate is somewhat unknown to most voters, the campaign has "launched aggressive efforts to promote him in television and print media."
Though Correa is still favored to win the election, Assange now represents a wild card in the political mix. The Guardian comments that "essentially [by providing diplomatic asylum to Assange], Correa has wrapped himself in the flag – in such a way that his conservative opponents are not able to criticize him effectively, lest they seem unpatriotic." Indeed, though Lasso must dislike Assange for disclosing sensitive diplomatic U.S. cables which cast him in an unfavorable light, the Guayaquil banker has been tight lipped about the whole affair now unfolding at the Ecuadoran Embassy in London. That is not too surprising, given that the issue seems to be playing to Correa's advantage and indigenous peoples have voiced their support for Assange.
According to the Guardian, political speech in the media and campaign advertising in Ecuador is severely restricted in the 90 days leading up to Election Day. That means that the next few months are going to be critical, with Lasso having only until November to make a dent in Correa's armor. "The longer and more dramatic the Assange case is," notes the Guardian, "and the longer Ecuador's diplomatic dispute with the UK and Sweden continues, the more the Ecuadorian election campaign will dwell on international affairs – a sphere the incumbent Correa dominates in relation to his opponents. With far fewer risks than the major electoral benefits it delivers, the diplomatic spat is clearly in Correa's political favor."
Assange, then, is now an unknown variable in larger geopolitical chess and even domestic politics within Ecuador. For better or worse, Correa has thrown in his lot with Assange, though to be sure the outcome of this imbroglio is hardly predictable at this point. Assange meanwhile undoubtedly hopes that Correa wins the election, lest his asylum bid be placed in jeopardy by a hostile Lasso administration smarting from earlier WikiLeaks revelations. Stay tuned for more ironic twists and turns.